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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in Lee v. Weisman held clergy-
delivered invocations at public-school graduation ceremonies uncon-
stitutional.1 In the wake of this landmark case, school boards across
the country instituted a variety of policies to avoid the establishmen-
tarian attributes fatal to the prayers in Lee. Several Courts of
Appeals soon heard cases involving authorities seeking to divorce
themselves from speakers and speaker selection, in the apparent
belief that school involvement placed the imprimatur of the state on
graduation prayer. Yet two facts mark all of the situations challenged
to date. First, an agent of the state, the school board, exercised
governmental power in determining the process for selecting speak-
ers. Second, members of a captive audience found themselves subject
to the same pressure to participate in the prayer as was present in
Lee, irrespective of who led the prayer and the process for selecting
that person. Despite these unifying potentially unconstitutional
features, post-Lee circuit courts have employed a wide variety of
analyses2 in deciding Establishment Clause challenges to graduation
prayer and have issued expressly conflicting opinions in near-
identical cases.3
This Note examines the major attempts to interpret and apply
Lee to school board policies adopted in response to that case. It
identifies the analytical shortcomings of each decision and reconciles
their inconsistencies with Lee and the Supreme Court's other cases
addressing public schools and the First Amendment.4
Part II briefly explores pre-Lee Establishment Clause doctrine.
It explains the "coercion" analysis that dominates the Lee opinion. It
also lays out the competing equal access principle, which carried the
day in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia
and has since been used to justify prayers at high school graduations.
Part III describes schools' attempts to avoid the flaws fatal to
the principal's actions in Lee by using predetermined objective criteria
or vesting the speaker-selection power in another body. It then
1. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992).
2. See ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg. Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996) (applying
five different tests); Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1996) (same);
Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994) (same); Jones v. Clear Creek
Indep. Sch. Dist. (Jones II), 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992) (same).
3. See Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1482-83 (criticizing Jones H and following Harris).
4. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (permitting
schools to punish students for sexually suggestive speech at assemblies).
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explains the critical facts underlying Lee v. Weisman.5 Finally, Part
III identifies the common features of Lee and subsequent graduation
prayer cases from the perspective of an audience member.
Part IV observes that the graduation prayer cases lie at the
intersection of several First Amendment doctrines. Lower courts
have balanced the coercion analysis against the equal access doctrine.
While courts often use "coercion" or "forum" language, the result has
too frequently turned on behind-the-scenes speaker selection criteria.
In two prominent Ninth Circuit cases, for example, agent-of-the-state
analysis proved fatal to student-controlled invocations in one case,6
while another panel held a class rank-based invitation to speak
sufficiently secular to avoid establishment. 7
This Note demonstrates that none of the decisions satisfacto-
rily integrates all of the relevant First Amendment doctrines. For
example, a largely ignored line of cases validates official supervision
of student speech when schools create the forum.8 Moreover, this
Note argues that the graduation prayer decisions to date consistently
ignore the fact that the result of a board's policy choice to permit an
invocation is the same no matter what method determines the
speaker. Recognizing this phenomenon certifies that the graduation
audience, who must listen to whomever mounts the stage, is captive
to the state's speaker-selecting decisions, at whatever level they
operate. Thus, graduation most closely resembles other pedagogical
functions, to which courts do not apply open forum analysis. Accord-
ingly, schools cannot deny responsibility for the content of com-
mencement programs. The Establishment Clause restrictions present
in the classroom must also control graduation ceremonies. Only such
comprehensive analysis sufficiently integrates the various analytical
paradigms that the Supreme Court has established. Consequently,
the only graduation speaker policy consistent with the Court's
dictates bars all speakers from delivering a message infused with
religious content.
5. Lee, 505 U.S. at 586 (explaining the dominant facts of Lee, which set the parameters of
that decision).
6. See Harris, 41 F.3d at 454-57.
7. See Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832, 838 (9th Cir. 1998).
8. See generally Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kublmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (allowing school
principal to censor student works in school newspaper); Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (sustaining school
suspension of student using lewd and offensive speech in student address).
1999] 1785
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON
RELIGION AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS
First among the Bill of Rights' panoply of enumerated guaran-
tees, the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause9 work
together to free the conscience of official interference.1°  The latter
clause proscribes government actions that directly interfere with
individuals' ability to worship.11 The former prohibits more subtle
state acts that tend to establish an official religion, whether or not
they overtly coerce non-adherents.12 No official body may organize a
church, participate in ecclesiastical matters, or permit a religious
organization to participate in the affairs of state.13 The legislature
may not levy a tax in support of religious activities or institutions,
and the clauses forbid laws that aid a particular religion or religion in
general.14 Finally, the state may not, either in fact or appearance,
take sides in a religious controversy; nor may it make belief or non-
belief in a particular faith relevant to an individual's participation in
political life.' 5
A. The Lemon Test and Beyond
After upholding a statute authorizing public funding for
transportation to parochial schoolsis and striking down a law requir-
ing public school children to recite a nonsectarian prayer,17 the United
States Supreme Court fashioned a test for dealing with Establish-
9. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof ... " U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The Supreme Court has interpreted the
Fourteenth Amendment as incorporating the prohibitions of the First Amendment against the
states. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1939)).
10. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 730 (1871) (declaring that "Itihe structure
of our government has, for the preservation of civil liberty, rescued the temporal institutions
from religious interference[;] . . . it has secured religious liberty from the invasion of the civil
authority').
11. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962).
12. See id.; see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586 (1992).
13. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.
14. See id.
15. See Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594 (1989).
16. The Court reasoned that bussing was a secular state benefit open to all pupils and
that denying it to parochial school children would discriminate against religion. See Everson,
330 U.S. at 17.
17. The Court held that a so-called Regent's prayer resembled establishment of an official
religion and that putting government resources and prestige behind an approved religious belief
exerted pressure on minorities to conform. See Engel, 370 U.S at 425.
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ment Clause challenges in Lemon v. Kurtzman.18 Designed to combat
the evils targeted by the Establishment Clause,19 what became known
as the Lemon test required that laws satisfy three criteria: they must
have a secular legislative purpose, their principal effect must be
neither advancement nor inhibition of religion, and they must not
foster excessive state entanglement with religion.20 Failure to satisfy
a single element of the test is fatal to the challenged law or policy.21
Lemon also made clear that bright-line rules do not fairly deal with
the myriad situations where church and state intermingle. 2  Each
decision turns on the particular facts presented.23
Applying the Lemon test in Lynch v. Donnelly, the Court
described the substance and extent of its inquiry.24 If a secular
purpose25 motivated the policy, or could be gleaned from the facts, the
policy fulfills the purpose requirement.26 Of course, a purported
secular purpose must be genuine; sham rationales do not merit
consideration.27 While an act or law might benefit religion, its
18. The Court's decision resolved multiple cases involving similar Rhode Island and
Pennsylvania statutes that supplemented salaries of parochial-school teachers who taught only
secular subjects and met certain other requirements, such as being state certified and teaching
in a school with lower per-pupil costs than public schools. See generally Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
19. The Court identified three main evils: "sponsorship, financial support, and active
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity." Id. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
20. See id.at 612-13 (explaining the test as a synthesis of the "cumulative criteria
developed by the Court over many years').
21. Consequently, a decision holding a policy unconstitutional need not address all three
elements of the test, although a decision upholding a law must consider each aspect. See
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985).
22. The Court noted that "[j]udicial caveats against entanglement must recognize that the
line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending
on all the circumstances of a particular relationship." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614. Moreover, "the
Constitution [does not] require complete separation of church and state; it affirmatively
mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward
any." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).
23. See, for example, Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619-20, where the Court held that the states'
attempt to comply with the Establishment Clause by conditioning aid on pervasive restrictions
itself created the forbidden entanglement.
24. See generally Lynch, 465 U.S. 668 (considering a city's display of a nativity scene in a
private park during the Christmas holiday season).
25. The purpose need not be exclusively secular. The secular purpose element merely
requires that some secular design lay behind the act in question. See id. at 681 n.6 (noting that
many policies previously upheld by the Court would fail an exclusively secular purpose test).
26. The nativity scene in question was "sponsored by the city to celebrate the Holiday and
to depict the origins of that Holiday. These are legitimate secular purposes." Id. at 681.
27. Compare Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (noting that the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island
statutes themselves expressed the secular purpose of improving education for all and that the
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primary effect must be a substantial benefit to a faith, or to religion in
general, in order to constitute impermissible establishment under the
second prong of Lemon.28 Finally, state involvement with religion
must be extensive or prolonged to raise an entanglement concern,
which is fundamentally a question of kind and degree.29
The Lynch concurrence0 proffered a refinement of the Lemon
test that gained several adherents, 31 though the Court has never
unreservedly adopted it. The concurrence asserted that government
violates the Establishment Clause by either excessively entangling
itself with religious institutions32 or endorsing or disapproving of
religion. 33 The concurrence subsumed the purpose prong of Lemon
into its refinement of the effect prong: courts should consider both
what the state intended to communicate by its acts and what message
the conduct actually conveyed.34 Under this approach, even if an act's
Court had no reason to believe the legislatures intended otherwise), with Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (per curiam) (ignoring an "avowed" secular purpose behind displaying the
Ten Commandments in public school classrooms and finding its preeminent purpose "plainly
religious').
28. The Court remarked that the nativity scene's effect" 'merely happen[ed] to coincide or
harmonize with the tenets of some... religions.'" Lynch, 465 U.S. at 682 (quoting McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)). "[IThe Court has made it abundantly clear... that not
every law that confers an indirect, remote, or incidental benefit upon [religion] is, for that
reason alone, constitutionally invalid." Id. at 683 (internal quotations omitted). In upholding
the city's sponsorship of the display, the Court deemed its beneficial effect on religion minimal
and likened it to the display of religious paintings in government-supported museums. See id.
29. After noting that there was no administrative entanglement or other contact with
church authorities regarding the display, the Court observed that there was nothing "like the
comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance or the enduring entanglement
present in Lemon." Id. at 684 (internal quotations omitted).
30. Id. at 687-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
31. Five years later, the Court in Allegheny County v. ACLU indicated that O'Connor's
analysis in Lynch was, at a minimum, accurate. Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-
94 (1989). In a portion of his opinion for the Court, which only Justice Stevens joined, Justice
Blackmun condemned the Lynch majority opinion as unworkable and argued that Justice
O'Connor's concurrence presented superior reasoning. See id. at 594-97 (Blackmun, J., writing
specially).
32. The concurrence feared that this may interfere with these institutions' independence,
give them access to government not enjoyed by non-adherents, and "foster the creation of
political constituencies defined along religious lines." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
33. According to the concurrence, endorsement would indicate to non-adherents that they
are political outsiders and cause adherents to consider themselves a favored class. See id.
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
34. This approach involves both subjective and objective examinations of the message.
See id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The former examination is subjective because it asks
what message the government intended to communicate by its actions in the particular case.
See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). The latter examination is objective because it relies on the
words or deeds themselves and asks what a reasonable person observing the government's
conduct would think. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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primary purpose was advancement or inhibition of religion, the act
would remain constitutionally valid as long as the practice does "not
have the effect of communicating a message of government endorse-
ment or disapproval of religion."3s
In Wallace v. Jaffree, the Court invoked the purpose prong of
the Lemon test to invalidate an Alabama law mandating periods of
silence in schools "for meditation or voluntary prayer."36 The decision,
however, indicated the critical importance of fact-intensive case-by-
case analysis. Declaring it "appropriate to ask 'whether government's
actual purpose is to endorse... religion,' "37 the Court went beyond
the statute's text and extensively considered its legislative history.38
The Court found the state's argument that the statute merely
permissibly accommodated religion 39 unconvincing and instead relied
on statements of the bill's sponsor indicating that his only purpose
was to return voluntary prayer to public schools.4° Based on these
statements and reference to a prior moment-of-silence law, which did
not mention prayer, the Court held that the statute "indi-
cate[d] ... the State['s] inten[tion] to characterize prayer as a favored
practice" and that such an endorsement violated the requirement of
government neutrality toward religion.41 The two concurring Wallace
35. Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Thus, the concurrence concluded that, in Lynch,
the subjective purpose of displaying the nativity scene within the context of religiously neutral
icons "was not promotion of the religious content of the [scene] but celebration of [a] public
holiday through its traditional symbols. Celebration of public holidays, which have cultural
significance even if they also have religious aspects, is a legitimate secular purpose." Id. at 691
(O'Connor, J., concurring). In light of the inobtrusive holiday festivities context, the display's
surroundings secularized what objective viewers could reasonably understand to be the purpose
of the display, even though its intrinsic religious significance was not neutralized. See id. at 692
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Accordingly, the concurrence deemed the display constitutionally
sound, as it was neither intended to endorse nor in fact endorsed Christianity. See id. at 694
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
36. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40 (1985) (quoting ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp.
1984)).
37. Id. at 56 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
38. See id. at 56-60.
39. The state sought to cast the statute as furthering the goals of the Free Exercise
Clause. See id. at 57-58 n.45. The Court suggested that the state offered this justification only
in the context of litigation. See id.
40. State Senator Donald Holmes inserted statements into the legislative record without
apparent dissent and confirmed for the trial court the pro-religion purpose described therein.
See id. at 56-57.
41. Id. at 60.
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opinions confirm that a case-specific, fact-intensive inquiry laid at the
heart of the Court's decision.42
In its more recent jurisprudence, the Court has frequently
ignored or recast the reasoning set forth in Lemon and the Lynch
concurrence. The Court has "repeatedly emphasized... [an] unwill-
ingness to be confined to any single test or criterion."43 For instance,
in Marsh v. Chambers-approving Nebraska's practice of putting
chaplains on the public payroll and having them open legislative
sessions with a prayer-the Court trumped Lemon with historical
analysis of the Establishment Clause's meaning.44 Most significantly
for this Note's purposes, the slim Lee v. Weisman majority chose to
resolve a graduation prayer case without "reconsidering the general
constitutional framework by which public schools' efforts to accommo-
date religion are measured,"45 and instead crafted fresh analysis.
Given these and other departures,46 and the fierce criticism of
the test,47 the continuing validity of Lemon has come into doubt.48
Several recent dissents have vigorously criticized Lemon and the
Court's disorderly treatment of Establishment Clause cases. Justice
Scalia, concurring in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School District, pointed out that by the time of that 1993 decision, five
then-sitting justices had personally criticized Lemon and a sixth had
joined an opinion doing so. 49 He argued that Lemon survives as a
judicial fig leaf because the Court can ignore the rule entirely when it
42. Id. at 62-67 (Powell, J., concurring) (expressing dismay at Alabama's persistent
attempts to sponsor prayer in public schools); id. at 67-84 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)
(pointing out the peculiar features of the Alabama law that render it invalid and explaining why
other moment-of-silence laws do not necessarily violate the Establishment Clause).
43. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (reviewing precedent demonstrating
disparity in its Lemon test application).
44. After noting that opening legislative sessions with prayer is "deeply embedded in the
history and tradition of this country," Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983), the Court
explained that history led it to accept the interpretation of First Amendment draftsmen who,
given their own practice of supporting official chaplains, "saw no real threat to the Establish-
ment Clause arising from a practice of prayer similar to [Nebraska's]." Id. at 791.
45. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
46. See, e.g., Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 589-94, 598-623 (1989) (analyzing
an Establishment Clause question without a majority of the Court applying the Lemon test).
47. Chief Justice Rehnquist remarked that Lemon "has no basis in the history of the
amendment it seeks to interpret, is difficult to apply and yields unprincipled results .... "
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
48. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 n.7
(1993) (recognizing Justice Scalia's admonishment to the Court for turning to Lemon).
49. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398-99 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (listing ten non-
majority opinions criticizing Lemon).
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wishes to uphold a practice Lemon forbids and can invoke it to strike
down a practice the Court dislikes.50
Furthermore, Justice Scalia, among others,51 considers many of
the Court's tests and guidelines too restrictive. Basing his analysis on
the First Amendment's origins and history, Scalia declared that the
Court has recently been too swift to strike down practices that
acknowledge religion without actually establishing it.52 He has
proposed that the Free Exercise Clause mandates government respect
for religion rather than official agnosticism. 53 In support of this more
permissive policy, Scalia pointed out that certain long-running
practices acknowledging religion, such as printing "In God We Trust"
on currency and opening legislative sessions with prayers, do not run
afoul of the Constitution. 54 Scalia has yet to command a majority for
his position, but his observation that Lemon presently stands on
shaky ground is undoubtedly correct.
50. Justice Scalia cited cases invoking and ignoring Lemon and one calling it helpful. See
id. at 399 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). He wrote separately because he refused to apply
Lemon under any circumstances. See id. at 399-400 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
Dissenting in Lee a year earlier, Scalia wrote, "Today's opinion shows.., why... our
Constitution [ ] cannot possibly rest upon the changeable philosophical predilections of the
Justices of this Court, but must have deep foundations in the historic practices of our people."
Lee, 505 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51. Three justices joined Justice Scalia's lengthy and sweepingly critical dissent in Lee.
See id. at 631. Justice Thomas joined Scalia's opinion in Lamb's Chapel. Lamb's Chapel, 508
U.S. at 397 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). And Justice Rehnquist, among the earliest
critics of Lemon, agrees that at least the purpose and effect analyses "are in no way based on
either the language or intent of the drafters." Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 108 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
52. For example, dissenting in Lee, he wrote that citizens should be free to join in prayer
at public functions if they so choose. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia
further opined that to exorcise religion from all official functions "in order to spare the
nonbeliever what seems to me the minimal inconvenience of standing or even sitting in
respectful nonparticipation, is as senseless in policy as it is unsupported in law." Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Additionally, he rejected the notion that the Constitution forbids official
endorsement of religion in general. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 400 (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment).
53. Scalia reasoned that, since the Constitution itself places religion in a favored category
(by specifically forbidding state interference with individuals' free exercise of their beliefs) and
the Framers supported "public virtues inculcated by religion," the Court should permit a closer
relationship between church and state than Lemon allows. Id. at 399-401 (Scalia, J., concurring
in judgment).
54. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 632-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
673-78 (1984) (noting state accommodation of religion and the permissibility of putting "In God
We Trust" on money and inserting "under God" into the Pledge of Allegiance).
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Despite this movement away from Lemon in religion cases
generally, the Supreme Court has, at least until recently,55 consis-
tently enforced near-total separation of church and state in public
schools. The Court's decisions over the last three decades, selectively
applying the Lemon test, have furnished little guidance on the proper
application of concededly difficult rules. Not surprisingly, then, the
slim majority in Lee took an unorthodox approach to the question
before it.
B. Lee v. Weisman and the Coercion Analysis
The majority in Lee expressly declined to reconsider the Lemon
test 56 and declared that the Court need not revisit cases that lay on
the cusp of establishment. 57 Instead, the Court suggested that the
actions of school officials, in inviting a rabbi to deliver prayers at a
public-school graduation, violated well-settled caselaw, which
proscribed all forms of official religious coercion. 8 The Court set forth
the two dominant facts that controlled its decision. First, "[s]tate
officials direct[ed] the performance of a formal religious exercise
at... graduation ceremonies for secondary schools." 9  Second,
"attendance and participation in the state-sponsored religious activity
[were] in a fair and real sense obligatory."60 In finding the prayer
unconstitutional, the Court focused on the state's control over the
existence and content of the prayer, the involuntary attendance by
secondary school students, and the unavailability of a meaningful
method of expressing dissent.61
The Court regarded the school principal's decision to include
an invocation and a benediction as tantamount to a deliberate
legislative decree that prayers must be delivered at graduation
55. The Court's most recent schools cases indicate that it may be softening its stance on
separation of church and school. See generally Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997)
(overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S.
819 (1995) (ordering public university to fund, on the same terms as other publications, a
Christian newspaper).
56. Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.
57. In this group, the Court included Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), and
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). See Lee, 505 U.S. at 586.
58. See id. at 587 (declaring that "the Constitution guarantees that government may not
coerce anyone to support or participate in religion... or otherwise act in a way which
establishes a state religion or religious faith, or tends to do so" (internal quotations omitted)).
59. Id. at 586.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 586-99.
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ceremonies.2 The Court expressed unease at the potential divisive-
ness of selecting a cleric to perform in the ceremony, and noted that
although audience members' objections do not control the constitu-
tionality of a policy, the unavailability of a meaningful opportunity for
dissenting expression made the selection particularly unsettling.63
Additionally, the Court regarded the principal's issuing guidelines for
non-sectarian invocations at civic events as a method of state control
over the prayer.6 Taken together, the lack of opportunity for critics to
voice dissent and the high degree of state control over the speaker and
the message "made it clear that the graduation prayers bore the
imprint of the State and put school-age children who objected in an
untenable position.65
Indeed, the Court focused on the effect of the prayer on the
children in the audience, with this analysis consuming the better part
of the opinion. Critically, the Court rejected the argument that
attendance at graduation ceremonies is voluntary.66 For the Court,
contending that a teenage student, who had worked for years to reach
the culturally significant celebration of commencement, had the
option to absent herself from the ceremony without forfeiting her
diploma was "formalistic in the extreme."67 Forcing students to choose
between forfeiting the intangible benefits of graduation or submitting
to a state-directed religious presentation rendered the theoretical
availability of a choice to attend legally meaningless.68 Thus, the
Court wrote, graduations are obligatory and the cleric's audience was
a captive one that the state had marshaled before him.69
The Court also discussed students' ability to express dissent
while still participating in the obligatory ceremony.70 According to the
Court, the school's supervision of the ceremony placed both public and
peer pressure on students to "stand as a group or, at least, maintain
respectful silence during the invocation and benediction. This
pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt
62. See id. at 587.
63. See id. at 587-88.
64. See id. at 588.
65. Id. at 590.
66. See id. at 595.
67. Id.
68. The Court found that, for religious dissenters, the choice between religious freedom
and collecting the rewards society normally confers on graduates was no choice at all. See id. at
595-96.
69. See id. at 597.
70. See id. at 593.
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compulsion."71 Moreover, in the context of a group standing in silence
during a graduation prayer, the Court found that high-school-age
dissenters have no method of expressing their non-support for the
exercise short of outright protestation.72 Since students face this
dilemma in a setting of intense social and peer pressure to conform,
the Court observed, they have no legally significant choice.73 Ulti-
mately, the Constitution no more allows the state to take advantage
of these social pressures to exact religious conformity than it allows
the state to use direct means.74
The Court concluded that the state's act of turning over the
commencement podium to a person leading a religious exercise
amounted to coercing students to participate in a formal religious
practice. 75 When "young graduates who object are induced to conform"
to the state-sanctioned orthodoxy, the Court held, the Establishment
Clause has been violated.76
C. Mergens, Rosenberger, and the Equal Access Principle
Schools may create an open forum, void of Lee's coercion, to
enable religious discussions on campus. A long line of Supreme Court
cases permits otherwise establishmentarian activity when the state
has created an open forum because all speakers, regardless of
viewpoint have a right to equal access to the forum.77
In Board of Education of the Westside Community Schools v.
Mergens, the Court reviewed the federal Equal Access Act, which
required certain public secondary schools to accommodate student
religious groups when creating a forum open to other school groups. 78
Codifying the holding of Widmar v. Vincent,79 the Act mandated equal
access to school facilities during non-instructional periods for non-
curriculum related groups regardless of the political or religious views
of group members, provided that membership in the group is volun-
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 593-94.
74. See id. at 594.
75. See id. at 597-98.
76. Id. at 599.
77. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Board of Educ. v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
78. The Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1998), applied to secondary schools
receiving federal assistance. See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 235-36.
79. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 275-77 (holding that when a university creates a limited open
forum for student expression, it must, under the Free Speech Clause, allow religious groups to
take advantage of the forum).
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tary and that the state not influence the form of any religious
activity. 0
The plurality8 reviewed the Act under the Lemon framework,
which the Court had used to invalidate the university policy denying
equal access in Widmar.82 Because the Act's purpose of preventing
content-based discrimination against student groups neither endorsed
nor disapproved of religion,83 and the Act forbade entangling faculty
promotion of, or participation in, meetings,8 the critical question
under the Lemon analysis became whether the Act's primary effect
was advancement of religion. The school argued that holding "student
religious meetings... under school aegis," while compulsory atten-
dance laws provided "a ready-made audience for student evangelists,"
would prompt students to perceive official support for the meetings.85
The plurality found three grounds for rejecting this contention. First,
secondary school students could understand the distinction between
government speech endorsing religion and non-discriminatory
government accommodation of private speech that might be relig-
ious.M Second, since school officials did not actively participate in
meetings and because the students held meetings outside the instruc-
tional classroom setting, where attendance is compulsory, state
endorsement or coercion of belief seemed unlikely.87 And third, since
religious clubs were "merely one of many different [kinds of] student-
initiated voluntary clubs, students should perceive no message of
government endorsement of religion."88
80. See Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74. The Court decided that freedom of speech
required the school district in Mergens to grant religious groups equal access on statutory,
rather than constitutional, grounds. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 247 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.).
The Court then decided whether such access violates the Establishment Clause. See id. at 247-
62 (opinions of the four-member plurality per O'Connor, J., and the two-member concurrence
per Kennedy, J.). The latter part of the decision is no less constitutional in character than
Widrnar and Rosenberger.
81. Justice O'Connor announced the opinion of the Court; five other justices joined in the
factual account and the statutory interpretation portion of the opinion. See id. at 229-30.
Justices Kennedy and Scalia concurred in judgment, refusing to join the plurality's discussion of
endorsement and finding no Establishment Clause violation because the law does not coerce
students into participating in religious activities. See id. at 260-62 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
82. See id. at 248-52 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.).
83. See id. at 248-49 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.).
84. See id. at 252-53 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.).
85. Id. at 249 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.).
86. See id. at 250-51 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.).
87. See id. at 251 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.).
88. Id. at 252 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.).
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The concurrence rejected the plurality's application of the
Lemon test, 9 focusing instead on the conviction that "the government
cannot coerce any student to participate in a religious activity."90 The
concurrence found that, because the Act did not require or even
encourage student participation and meetings could not take place
during school hours, it posed no threat of coercing students.91
Three years after Mergens and a year after Lee, the Court
affirmed application of the equal access principle in Lamb's Chapel,
even as individual justices continued their debate over the propriety
of the endorsement and coercion analyses.92 In that case, the Court
held that requiring a school district, which permitted a variety of
community organizations to use its facilities after hours, to open its
doors to groups with a religious perspective created no realistic
danger that the public would regard the district's content-neutral
accommodation of groups as endorsing religion93
In 1995, the Court faced a pointed question concerning the
reach of the equal access principle. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of the University of Virginia involved a state university's denial of
89. Kennedy's opinion never referred to the Lemon test and considered the endorsement
test useless because the term "endorsement" has insufficient meaning to be dispositive. See id.
at 261 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 260 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy also wrote that "direct [state]
benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact establishes a [state] religion or religious faith,
or tends to do so," violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 260 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(internal quotations omitted).
91. See id. at 260-61 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Foreshadowing the majority in Lee,
Justice Kennedy stated that the proper test should be whether government imposes pressure on
students to participate in religious activity, viewed in light of the special circumstances of
"secondary school[,] where the line between voluntary and coerced participation may be difficult
to draw." Id. at 261-62 (Kennedy, J., concurring). It should be noted that Justice Souter,
concurring with the five-to-four majority in Lee, supported the endorsement analysis of the
Mergens plurality opinion and declared that a coercion standard set the Establishment bar too
high. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 618 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring). Souter regarded
religious coercion as barred by the Free Exercise Clause; the spectrum of laws "respecting" an
establishment of religion was necessarily broader. See id. at 621 (Souter, J., concurring).
According to Souter, the Establishment Clause mandated neutrality toward religion, such that
the state cannot favor or endorse a particular sect or religion generally. See id. at 627 (Souter,
J., concurring).
92. See generally Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384
(1993). Three justices concurred in the judgment, writing to express their displeasure at the
resurgence of the Lemon test and the endorsement analysis. See id. at 397 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); id. at 397-401 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Thomas, J.). Commentators
likewise kept the debate alive. See generally Julie Madison Angus, Note, Life Without Lemon:
The Status of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence after Rosenberger v. University of Virginia,
17 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 123 (1996) (arguing that Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger fouled the
jurisprudential waters and that the Lemon test offers superior standards).
93. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395.
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funding to a student-organized Christian newspaper. 94  The Court
characterized the case as involving the state creation of an open
forum for student ideas95 It had to resolve whether funding the
religious newspaper on the same terms as other student publications
would violate the Establishment Clause.96 Three facts prompted the
Court to compel funding of the newspaper. First, the University had
created a marketplace of ideas by making available state-collected
funds to student media groups. 97 Second, denying funds only to
journals with religious editorial opinions amounted to viewpoint-
discrimination.98 Third, the University had sufficiently divorced itself
from the content of recognized student publications"9 to make the
speech private, notwithstanding the University's facilitation of that
speech.100 According to the Court, funding the newspaper did not
violate the Establishment Clause because state benefits were avail-
able to groups with a wide range of opinions based on neutral
qualifying criteria, and there was no real likelihood that the state
would either endorse or compel speech.101 Not surprisingly, the
concurrence focused on whether the University's provision of funds
would endorse the publication's religious message.10 2
In an environment of decisions consistently indicating that
"there are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience
from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public
schools,1'o3 the circuit courts have attempted to apply the Supreme
94. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 822-23 (1995).
95. See id. at 841-46.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 828-32.
98. See id.
99. '"The University declares that the student groups eligible for [financial] support are
not the University's agents, are not subject to its control, and are not its responsibility." Id. at
835. The University required groups to sign statements indicating that they did not act on
behalf of the school and obligated the groups to communicate this absence of official endorse-
ment when dealing with third parties and in all written materials. See id. at 823-24.
100. See id. at 833-35. When the school is speaking or when it has enlisted a private
speaker to act in its behalf, as in traditional educational functions, the school maintains broad
discretion to make content- and viewpoint-based determinations of appropriate speech. See id.
at 833. Examples of this include selecting guest lecturers and speakers at assemblies.
However, viewpoint restrictions are inappropriate where an institution "expends funds to
encourage a diversity of views from private speakers." Id. at 834.
101. See id. at 840-45.
102. See id. at 846-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring). On the facts, it did not. See id. at 852
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
103. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992).
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Court's teachings to subtly shifting fact patterns, often with conflict-
ing results.
III. THE DOMINANT FACTS OF THE GRADUATION PRAYER CASES
Throughout the. 1990s, school districts instituted a variety of
policies designed to avoid the practices that the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional in Lee v. Weisman. Part ILA describes the facts
presented in seven circuit court cases that address these policies.
Part HLI.B highlights the similarities of these cases and indicates their
congruence with what this Note considers the critical elements of Lee.
The reasoning and outcome of the courts' decisions and their respec-
tive shortcomings appear in Part IV.
A. The Circuit Court Cases
School district policies designed to facilitate graduation prayer
have taken on a number of characteristics. Some districts have
allowed students to vote on whether they wish to have a prayer, and if
so, who will deliver the prayer. Other districts, while granting
students the ability to vote on whether they wish to have a prayer,
have limited who may deliver prayer to members of the graduating
class. In cases where a school district allows students to elect one of
their own to deliver a prayer, school officials have often retained some
measure of control over the content of the presentation. Still other
school districts, rather than allowing a student vote to control the
question, have permitted student speakers to deliver any message
they choose, including a prayer.
1. When Students Vote for a Prayer
The graduation ceremony for Grangeville High School in
Grangeville, Idaho, traditionally included an invocation and a
benediction.14 In 1990, the superintendent of Joint School District
No. 241, which included Grangeville High, circulated a memorandum
restating its policy on commencement prayers. 105 According to the
policy, principals allowed seniors to control every aspect of their
104. See Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 452 (9th Cir. 1994) (indicating that
prayers had taken place since at least the early 1980s).
105. See id. at 452-53.
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graduations.16 Students voted on whether they wanted an invocation
andlor a benediction.1 7 If they desired a prayer, students determined
if a minister or one of their own would offer it.108 If they wanted a
minister, the students selected him themselves; if they wanted a
classmate, the district encouraged but did not dictate electing the
third- or fourth-ranking student to offer the prayer.0 9 Senior class
officers had to contact all speakers directly.11° School officials did not
review the content of any presentations before the ceremonies."' As
in Lee, attendance at graduation was not a requirement for receiving
a diploma.112 In short, the school board allowed, but by no means
required, that commencement ceremonies include a religious presen-
tation and left the ultimate decision to the students.
The school district took steps to make public its ostensible
relinquishment of control over the ceremonies."1 Starting in 1991,
commencement programs included a disclaimer indicating that the
school district neither promoted nor endorsed the statements of any
speaker at the ceremonies."1 The district also indicated that it did
not consider commencement part of its educational program." 5
Students and a parent challenged the constitutionality of this policy
in Harris v. Joint School District No. 241.116
2. When Students May Elect Only One of Their Own to Pray
Until 1986, graduating seniors at Texas's Clear Lake High
School offered prayers invoking the "Lord," the "Gospel," and making
references to the omnipotence of a Christian "God."117 After students
complained, the school district crafted a policy that granted graduat-
106. See id. at 452.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 453.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 452-53.
114. See id. at 453.
115. See id.
116. Id. at 448.
117. See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist. (Jones 1), 930 F.2d 416, 417 (5th Cir. 1991),
vacated, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992), on remand, (Jones I), 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992).
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ing senior classes the choice of having invocations and benedictions.118
The policy required that a student volunteer deliver any prayer and
that the prayer be nonsectarian and nonproselytizing.119 Dissatisfied
with the reform, graduating seniors and parents contested the
constitutionality of the policy in Jones v. Clear Creek Independent
School District.120
Likewise, in Ingebretsen v. Jackson Public School District,
parents, students, and taxpayers challenged a 1994 Mississippi
statute that permitted "invocations, benedictions[,] or nonsectarian,
nonproselytizing student-initiated voluntary prayer" at commence-
ment ceremonies, in addition to other compulsory school functions.121
Meanwhile, a New Jersey school board had long observed the
practice of permitting a rotating group of local clergy to deliver a
nonsectarian invocation and benediction at its high-school graduation
ceremonies.122 In response to Lee, the school board adopted a policy
that, while declaring that officials could not endorse or promote
prayer at school functions, allowed the senior class to vote whether to
have a student-delivered prayer, a moment of silence, or nothing at all
at graduation.123 Printed programs would, like the policy, disclaim
any inference that speakers reflected the views of school officials.124
After a slim plurality of students voted for a prayer and volunteers
stepped forward to deliver it, a graduating senior sought the Highland
Regional High School principal's permission to have a member of the
ACLU speak to the graduates about safe sex and condom distribu-
tion.125 When the principal denied the request due to "time con-
118. See Jones I, 930 F.2d at 417. The policy required seniors to hear the "advice and
counsel" of the senior class principal, a faculty member who represented the class throughout its
four years. See id. at 417.
119. See id.
120. Id. at 418.
121. Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting 1994
Miss. Laws ch. 609, § 1(2)). As a matter of statutory interpretation, it is unclear whether the
invocations and benedictions permitted by the statute had to be delivered by students. Since
the Fifth Circuit declined to reconsider Jones H1 and approved of the Mississippi statute to the
extent that it allowed "students to choose to pray" at graduations, this Note considers the
statute as permitting only that. Id. at 280.
122. See ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg. Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1474 (3d Cir. 1996) (en
banc).
123. See id. at 1474-75. Under the policy, such prayer could be sectarian, proselytizing, or
"even degrading [to] other religions." Id. at 1484-85.
124. See id. at 1475.
125. See id.
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straints,' 126 the student and the ACLU challenged the prayer-
permitting policy in ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of
Education.127
A more recent graduation prayer case involves, not surpris-
ingly, a mosaic of several prior fact patterns: student discretion to
select student speakers to deliver an invocation and benediction "as
part of the graduation exercise,"128 after the school district screened
the speech for content and while it "maintained complete control over
the programs and facilities during the reading of the prayers."129
Apparently determined to introduce some sort of prayer into gradua-
tion ceremonies, the Santa Fe [Texas] Independent School District
engrafted into its final policy an automatic fallback option which
would add the requirement that any prayer be nonsectarian and
nonproselytizing if a court found its preferred policy unconstitu-
tional.130 Also at issue was the school district's "Football Policy,"
which "provid[ed] for a student-selected, student-given brief invoca-
tion and/or message.., during the pre-game ceremonies of home
varsity football games.''131 Several plaintiffs, who requested anonym-
ity, challenged these policies, which codified longstanding practice,
and other incidents and practices the Fifth Circuit described as
"disturbing" in Doe v. Santa Fe Independent School District.132
Following Lee v. Weisman, the Duval County [Florida] School
Board instructed schools "no longer to permit prayer" at their
graduation ceremonies.33 Public pressure, however, prompted
authorities to enact a policy consistent with Jones If, and students
soon began voting on whether to have student-led "messages" at the
beginning and end of their commencements.13 4 Under this policy, only
126. Id. The principal was willing "to arrest any student who might attempt to speak at
graduation without prior approval of the administration (even if graduates have approved) ......
Id. at 1484.
127. Id. at 1475. For the perspective of an attorney in a similar case that did not reach the
Court of Appeals, see Stephen B. Pershing, Graduation Prayer After Lee v. Weisman: A
Cautionary Tale, 46 MERCER L. REV. 1097 (1995) (describing Gearon v. Loudoun County Sch.
Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Va. 1993)).
128. Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1999).
129. Id. at 810.
130. See id. at 812.
131. Id. (internal quotations omitted). The football policy also included a safety clause that
required presentations be nonsectarian and nonproselytizing if a court invalidated the absolute
discretion granted to students in the original policy. See id.
132. Id. at 809-13.
133. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 174 F.3d 1236, 1251 (11th Cir. 1999).
134. See id.
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students that the majority selected could make such statements.135
Schools retained "tremendous control' over the ceremonies. 136 In
1992, ten of seventeen graduations in the school district included
prayers. 137 Students and parents sought damages and a declaratory
judgment that the policy "constituted an establishment of religion and
infringed on their free exercise of religion" in Adler v. Duval County
School Board.138
3. When a School Permits Students to Deliver a Religious Message
For seven years leading up to 1995, the high school in Rexburg,
Idaho, a community with a "high concentration of Mormons," included
both an invocation and a benediction in its commencement exer-
cises.139 When the school district changed its policy, it provided that
at least four students, identified by their class standing, could address
the audience at graduation in any manner they chose.140 Although
administrators could offer advice on the appropriate language for the
occasion, they could neither proscribe nor require any subject matter
or other content.141 While the school district appeared to have turned
over all control of certain commencement speeches to graduates,142 a
parent who feared retaliation from her community challenged the
policy, arguing in Doe v. Madison School District No. 321 that, by
permitting students to infuse the graduation ceremony with religious
speeches and songs, the policy coerced students.14
135. See id. at 1250.
136. Id. at 1244. "[T]he individual schools and the School Board: rented the facilities for
the graduation; told the graduating students what they should wear; decided when the
graduating students and audience could sit and stand; decided the sequence of events at the
graduation; and designed and printed the program for the ceremonies." Id.
137. See id. at 1251.
138. Id. at 1241.
139. Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832, 836 n.6 (9th Cir. 1998).
140. The policy specifically mentioned "an address, poem, reading, song, musical
presentation, prayer, or any other pronouncement." Id. at 834.
141. See id. Students were free to reject any advice offered. See id.
142. A formality that might go unenforced were students to launch into prolonged discus-
sions of topics such as condom distribution, cf. ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg. Bd. of Educ., 84
F.3d 1471, 1475 (3d Cir. 1996), this Note takes the district's policy at face value and presumes
no disingenuousness.
143. Madison Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d at 834. The parent also argued that the policy failed the
Lemon test. See id. at 836.
[Vol. 52:17831802
THE GRADUATION PRAYER CASES
B. The Critical Elements of Lee and the Common
Features of Each Fact Pattern
Before examining the common features of the post-Lee circuit
cases, it is helpful to distill the facts critical to the outcome of that
landmark case. Commentators'4 and subsequent courts 145 have
described Lee as establishing a "coercion test," and rightly so, as the
United States' argument and much of the opinion turned on the
extent to which the state's actions coerced students to participate in a
religious observance.146 Yet the Court also described the facts and
legal arguments surrounding the school principal's editorial control
over the prayers' content, a circumstance the school districts in
Harris, Adler, and Madison, but not Santa Fe, managed to avoid.
147
In Lee, the principal chose a rabbi to deliver the graduation
prayers.48 This choice, the Court reasoned, was attributable to the
state and potentially divisive.'49 The Court indicated that, even worse
than the principal's control over the speaker's identity, the principal's
decision to provide the rabbi with guidelines for nonsectarian "civic"
prayers amounted to state control of the prayers' content. 150 While
this conclusion may be valid from the perspective of a reviewing court,
the statement fails to mesh with the opinion's subsequent extensive
discussion of the condition of students in the audience, since students
might not know whether their principal had advised speakers on the
content of presentations. 5' Graduates would not necessarily observe
anything more than the handing over of the dais from school officials
to an individual with a religious offering. Thus, while the Lee
discussion avoided mentioning the Lemon test's entanglement prong,
the Court's consideration of the extent to which state officials "di-
rected and controlled the content of the prayers,152 which members of
144. See, e.g., Daniel N. McPherson, Student-Initiated Religious Expression in the Public
Schools: The Need for a Wider Opening in the Schoolhouse Gate, 30 CREIGHTON L. REv. 393, 419
(1997).
145. See, e.g., Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 814 (5th Cir. 1999); Jones v.
Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist. (Jones I), 977 F.2d 963, 966 (5th Cir. 1992).
146. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587, 590-99 (1992).
147. See supra Part IH.A.
148. Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 588.
151. Lee did not indicate whether students knew about their principal's provision of the
guidelines. Id. The presence or absence of this knowledge, in light of the long discussion of
coercion, seems far from outcome-determinative.
152. Id. at 588.
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the audience could not possibly observe themselves, seems like an
overture to caselaw that the facts did not require. Accordingly, this
Note regards the state's subjecting a captive audience to a religious
message alone sufficient to place the imprimatur of the state on the
speech, for that stands as the only state action students could observe
from their seats. 153 The case turns on coercion, and from the perspec-
tive of those being coerced, any state entanglement with religion
went-or at least could have gone-completely unobserved.
Ultimately, the Lee court found two "dominant facts" problem-
atic: (1) state direction of prayer--comprised of speaker selection and
content suggestions, and (2) coercion created by the mandatory nature
of graduation and peer pressure to conform.154 But the Court never
indicated that both factors were required to strike down the policy or
that the second factor alone would not suffice to support a finding of
unconstitutionality.155 And the concurrence focused its attention on
the coercive aspects at work.156 This Note puts aside the first factor
and focuses on the second, because the Court failed to appreciate the
salience of its own observations about the inescapable facts of high-
school commencement ceremonies in America today: they amount to a
state forum in which students attribute the entire content of the
program to the state, regardless of actual involvement. 157
In summary, the constitutionally significant elements of the
actions taken in Lee can be reduced to these critical facts: first,
through its school, the state exercised a policy choice in providing the
commencement podium to a third party for a religious presentation;
second, given the cultural significance of the event and the fact that
153. Two courts have held that a school's inherent control over its graduation ceremony
and its antecedent delegation of power to select a speaker is sufficient to satisfy the "first
dominant fact" of Lee that this Note here discounts. See ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg. Bd. of
Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1479-80 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 174 F.3d
1236, 1247-48 (11th Cir. 1999). Although as a conceptual matter the Black Horse Pike and Adler
courts' reasoning is convincing, the second dominant fact of Lee, coercion, takes place in the
open for all to observe and understand. Consequently, this Note finds the coercion analysis
logically stronger and, indeed, more compelling.
154. Lee, 505 U.S. at 586.
155. See id. at 586-99.
156. See id. at 599-609 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (focusing on the coercive aspects and
finding them alone sufficiently constitutionally unsound).
157. See Adler, 174 F.3d at 1248 (holding that the "policy does not dissociate student-
initiated sectarian and proselytizing prayer at a school-controlled graduation ceremony from the
imprint of the state under Lee, and that the state's endorsement of the prayer subjects it to a
facial violation of the Establishment Clause"); Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806,
817, 822 (5th Cir. 1999) (declaring that "government imprimatur is not so easily masked" and
that the inescapable circumstances of graduations "all militate against labeling such ceremonies
as public fora of any type").
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graduates have already earned their right to attend, graduation
speakers command a captive audience; and third, members of that
captive audience have no meaningful opportunity to express dissent-
ing beliefs.
The critical elements of the typical circuit court fact patterns
are no different from those in Lee. The school districts, with varying
degrees of success, responded to the Supreme Court's concerns about
overt entanglement but failed to remove coercion from the graduation
ceremonies. At the genesis of each situation, the state controlled who
would speak to the assembled graduates by setting the policy that
determined the speakers. The presentation a graduating student
faces-and under Lee is coerced by-is the same, which makes the
method of selecting the speaker immaterial. The cultural significance
of the ceremony remains, of course, identical, as do the coercive social
pressures operating on dissenters. No matter how unlimited the
range of topics selected speakers may cover, not all audience members
can realistically speak at the ceremony. Some will not want to take
the social risk of speaking out. In any event, and most importantly,
meaningful opportunities for dissent 158 cannot be had without turning
a simple high-school graduation into a political and religious circus.159
The only fact distinguishing the circuit court cases to date from Lee is
that the state permitted, rather than requested, a religious message.
As Part IV.D of this Note shows, that difference is constitutionally
insignificant.
IV. THE INTERSECTION OF SEVERAL FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINES
A. When Courts Selectively Employ Competing Paradigms
Once the Supreme Court departed from strict application of
the Lemon test, it started to selectively apply various analytical
paradigms. 160 Faced with muddled judicial pronouncements from
158. The Lee court characterized the opportunity for dissent as the ability to express
disapproval or, at least, non-participation. Lee, 505 U.S. at 593. The Court made clear that
even that narrow form of dissent cannot be found in the coercive environment inherent in the
state forum of graduation. See id. at 593-94.
159. Cf. id.; Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d at 816 (holding that "permitting the
uttering" of sectarian and proselytizing prayers would transform the character of "an event
intended to recognize and celebrate the graduating students' academic achievements and the
commonality of their presence" and "conceivably even disrupt it").
160. See supra Part H.A.
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Washington, lower federal courts sometimes chose to apply all of the
major tests of establishment.11 These courts have also employed
myriad variations on the traditional analyses and their exceptions.16
From the selective application of these tests, widely differing out-
comes in similar cases have come. 163
Just as Rosenberger laid at the intersection of the prohibition
of state funding of religion and the open forum doctrine,14 the recent
graduation prayer cases may be seen as the confluence of the equal
access principle and forbidden coercion of the conscience. Yet an
examination of the larger body of Supreme Court jurisprudence on the
First Amendment and the public schools reveals not only that
commencement ceremonies are not open forums, but that they are in
reality part-the final part-of the schools' pedagogical mission,
where Establishment concerns run high and protections are great.
The remainder of this Part will address each of the various
paradigms, the appropriateness of their analyses, and the conclusions
each prompts. Part IV.B discusses the agency principles which
dominated many early post-Lee decisions. While a finding of agency-
that any speaker, no matter how selected or controlled speaks for the
state-could quickly dispose of the graduation prayer cases, Part IV.C
deals with the most persuasive counter-argument, the open forum
doctrine. Part IV.D then considers the real-life implications of
graduation prayer, with a special focus on the social milieu in which
161. Five major (and perhaps overlapping) tests of First Amendment validity have
emerged, failure of any one of which fells a statute or policy: purpose, effect, entanglement,
endorsement, and coercion. See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist. (Jones 11), 977 F.2d 963,
966-72 (5th Cir. 1992). Applying all five has become common practice in religion-in-public-
schools cases. See generally ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg. Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir.
1996) (discussing each prong of the Lemon test, the endorsement analysis espoused by Justice
O'Connor in Lynch and Lee's coercion analysis); Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d
274 (5th Cir. 1996) (same); Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994) (same).
But see Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d at 814-19 (discussing all five tests and distinguish-
ing the case sub judice from facts of Lee but not actually applying the coercion test); Doe v.
Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 160, 166 n.7 (5th Cir. 1993) (explaining its rejection of
the Lemon test, preferring instead a "casebound... fact-sensitive" approach based on analogy
to Supreme Court decisions).
162. See generally Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d at 806 (using the nonsectarian and
nonproselytizing requirement it deemed central to Jones 11 in order "to dodge the outcome
otherwise dictated by Lee"); Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1998)
(relying on secular selection criteria and the open-forum analysis); Harris, 41 F.3d 447 (rejecting
Jones l1on agency principles); Jones II, 977 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1992) (relying on absence of both
religiosity and state direction of the prayers).
163. See, e.g., Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1482-83 (reciting the similarity of the facts
before it to those present in Jones I1 and Harris but rejecting the reasoning of Jones H and
finding Harris persuasive).
164. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 846 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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speakers and listeners find themselves. As the final section of this
Part demonstrates, all of the legal paradigms applicable to religious
speech and establishment, when properly conceived, applied, and
oriented to serve the purposes announced in Lee, yield a single,
coherent, logically consistent result: schools have a duty to avoid
graduation prayers.
B. What the School Cannot Do Itself
Following Lee, the legal community quickly faced a contentious
debate over the ability of schools to vest students with authority they
themselves could not exercise, that is, authority they did not have.165
This debate came to the fore in a deep and, as yet, unresolved split
between the Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.166 The
discussion opened when the Fifth Circuit decided Jones v. Clear Creek
Independent School District after the Supreme Court vacated and
remanded its prior judgment.
On remand, the Jones IT court reiterated its earlier findings of
secular purpose167 and want of entanglement.16 As to the effects test,
165. Some commentators have argued that schools should permit graduation prayers in
order to respect Free Exercise rights. See generally McPherson, supra note 144; Kimberly T.
Morgan, Note, Can Students Do What the State Cannot Do?: The Constitutionality of Student
Initiated, Sponsored, Composed and Delivered Prayers at Graduation, 12 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 273 (1996). Other commentators have reached the opposite conclusion. See
generally Jessica Smith, "Student-Initiated" Prayer: Assessing the Newest Initiatives to Return
Prayer to the Public Schools, 18 CAMPBELL L. REV. 303 (1996); Jonathan C. Drimmer, Hear No
Evil, Speak No Evil: The Duty of Public Schools to Limit Student-Proposed Graduation Prayers,
74 NEB. L. REV. 411 (1995).
166. See Doe v. Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir 1999), cert. granted sub nom.
Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, No. 99-62, 1999 WL495635, at *1 (Nov. 15 1999) (granting
certioari only to resolve the question "[w]hether petitioner's policy permitting student-led,
student-initiated prayer at football games violates the Establishment Clause"); Adler v. Duval
County Sch. Bd., 174 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated pending reh'g en banc, id. at 1274
(argued Oct. 19, 1999); Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832, vacated for mootness and lack
of standing, 177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Black Horse Pike, no petition for cert. filed;
Ingebretsen, 88 F.3d 274, cert. denied sub nom. Moore v. Ingebretsen, 519 U.S. 965 (1996);
Harris, 41 F.3d 447, vacated for mootness sub nom. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241 v. Harris, 515 U.S.
1154 (1995); Jones IT, 977 F.2d at 966-67, cert. denied, 508 U.S. 967 (1993); see also Thomas A.
Schweitzer, The Progeny of Lee v. Weisman: Can Student-Invited Prayer at Public School
Graduations Still be Constitutional?, 9 BYU J. PUB. L. 291, 306-07 (1995) (having described the
analytical divides in the graduation prayer cases, opining that the Supreme Court will soon
resolve the dispute).
167. Jones H, 977 F.2d at 966-67 (observing that nothing in Lee "questions [the Court's]
previous acknowledgements that solemnization is a legitimate secular purpose of ceremonial
prayer').
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the court conceded that three statements made in support of its
earlier holding had been "call[ed] into question" by Lee,169 but found
that the policy's nonsectarian and nonproselytizing requirement
meant that prayers would only awaken "extant religiosity for the
secular purpose of solemnization" rather than "increasing religious
conviction" or attracting converts. 170 Comparing the school district's
policy with those in Lee and Mergens,11 the court found no endorse-
ment of religion primarily because students who participated in the
decision whether to have an invocation would realize that any
religious message was that of a private speaker-like the religious
club in Mergens-rather than public speech of the state or its hand-
picked agent-like the rabbi in Lee.172 Finally, the Jones II court held
that Clear Creek's policy did not coerce students because, among
other factors, students would realize that any prayer represented the
will of their peers, which carries less coercive force than the actions of
the state or a cleric.173 The court recognized that its decision permit-
168. Id. at 967 (finding no institutional entanglement of church and state and remarking
that "[w]e know of no authority that holds yearly review of unsolicited material for sectarianism
and proselytization to constitute excessive entanglemene).
169. Id. (noting that Lee rejected reasoning based on the age of graduating seniors, the
brevity of the prayers, and the difference between the classroom and commencement settings).
170. Id. The court cited no authority for the proposition that "the [policy] can only advance
religion by increasing religious conviction among graduation attendees, which means attracting
new believers or increasing the faith of the faithful." Id. But see Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168
F.3d at 826-27 (Jolly, J., dissenting) (contesting the significance of the nonsectarian, nonprosely-
tizing requirement).
171. The court observed that four justices in Lee considered the prayers an unconstitutional
endorsement and that a plurality found no impermissible endorsement in Mergens. See Jones
H, 977 F.2d at 968 (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 604-09 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) and id. at 618-19 (Souter, J., concurring)).
172. See Jones II, 977 F.2d at 968-69. The court held that "Clear Creek does not
unconstitutionally endorse religion if it submits the decision of graduation invocation content, if
any, to the majority vote of the senior class." Id. at 969.
173. Id. at 969-72. The court identified the critical elements of Lee as "(1) the government
direct[ing] (2) a formal religious exercise (3) in such a way as to oblige the participation of
objectors." Id. at 970. The court found nothing in Clear Creek's policy analogous to the
direction and control of prayers found in Lee. See id. at 970-71. The court also rejected a
finding of religiosity by stating that "the [policy] tolerates nonsectarian, nonproselytizing
prayer, but does not require or favor it." Id. at 971. However, the court did not explain how
these standards for the prayer it permits removed religiosity, see id. at 971, an oversight
particularly troubling in light of the court's recognition that the prayer in Lee was also
nonsectarian and nonproselytizing. See id. at 965. But see Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist, 168 F.3d
at 826-27 (Jolly, J., dissenting) (disputing the significance of nonsectarian nonproselytizing
requirements). And though it had previously noted that the de minimis nature of the prayers
and the age of the students were immaterial under Lee, see id. at 967, the court insisted that
any potential for coercion was lessened by the reduced impressionability of graduating seniors,
making the situation more analogous to "innocuous" legislative invocations wherein all parties
are adults. See id. at 971-72 (implicitly referring to, though not citing, the reasoning and
holding of Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding the practice of opening legislative
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ted a majority of students to do what the state could not but pursued
the point no further.174
Two years later, the Ninth Circuit returned the Fifth's salvo
with Harris v. Joint School District No. 241, a decision that essen-
tially turned on agency principles.175 The court observed state
involvement in part because the school paid for the graduation and
officials attended and approved of it.176 Critical to the court's decision,
though, was the uncontested fact that seniors had authority to make
decisions regarding the graduation ceremony only because the school
had granted them that power. 77 To the court, permitting the state to
vest power in private actors or the outcome of elections, and then
removing constitutional restraints on that power, would defeat the
purpose of placing enumerated rights beyond the whim of majori-
ties.178 Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the court held that
private citizens exercising governmental authority may wield that
power only within the confines of the Constitution.79 As the school
district could not itself deliver a prayer, neither could its delegates. 1'
sessions with state-paid chaplains)). But see Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 174 F.3d 1236,
1248 (11th Cir. 1999) (observing that audience members' cogent awareness that views expressed
reflect those of the majority subjects them to "even greater compulsion to participate)'; id. at
1253 (Kravitch, J., concurring) (observing that "a prayer from the lips of a popularly elected
student representative is far more likely to coerce audience participation than one from a
member of the clergy selected by the school principal').
174. See Jones 1, 977 F.2d at 972.
175. Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994).
176. See id. at 454 (noting that "graduation is ultimately a school-controlled, school-
sponsored event'). The district superintendent remarked that "[tihe graduation ceremony is the
presentation by the school of diplomas representing graduation certificates to the people who
have fulfilled the requirements of the high school for graduation." Id. (internal quotations
omitted).
177. See id. The court cited Collins v. Chandler Unified School District, 644 F.2d 759, 761
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 863 (1981), for the proposition that there is '"no meaningful
distinction between school officials acting directly and school officials merely permitting
students to direct" school-sponsored events. Harris, 41 F.3d at 454 (internal quotations
omitted).
178. See id. at 455. "[A] decision to the contrary would allow school boards in religious
communities generally to avoid Establishment Clause concerns in the public schools. The
school board could allow students to vote daily prayers and the Ten Commandments back into
their classrooms." Id. (citing Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (banning daily prayers), and
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (prohibiting the display of the Ten Commandments in
classrooms)).
179. See Harris, 41 F.3d at 455 (citing Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966)).
180. When one recalls that the rabbi in Lee became a state actor by having been selected to
speak and given guidelines for nonsectarian prayers by the school principal, Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577, 587-89 (1992), the Ninth Circuit's holding here seems little more than a statement
of the obvious.
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In ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of Education, the
Third Circuit, sitting en banc, found the reasoning of Harris "more
persuasive" than Jones 11.181 Employing the agency analysis to refute
the board of education's free speech argument, 8 ' the Black Horse Pike
court did not mince words. It resoundingly echoed the Harris court
and found that an otherwise impermissible practice under Lee cannot
be cleansed by putting the choice of imposing religious doctrine to a
plebiscite. 18 While the delegation appeared to be a neutral device for
students to control a portion of their commencement, it could not
"insulate the School Board from the reach of the First Amendment."'1
The court directly confronted and rejected Jones ITs attempts to
distinguish putatively student-controlled graduation prayers from the
impermissible prayers in Lee. 85
Following this criticism of the principle that students can do
what schools cannot, the Fifth Circuit backtracked a few steps and
supposedly clarified its Jones H holding with Santa Fe.ls8 Bound by a
strict Fifth Circuit stare decisis rule,187 the court could not overturn
181. ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg. Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1483 (3d Cir. 1996).
182. "The Board relie[d] upon the student referendum in an attempt to define the
controversy as one impacting upon the students' right of free speech as opposed to a dispute
over the constitutionality of prayer at a public high school graduation." Id. at 1477. The board's
freedom of speech arguments traced the open-forum analysis. See id. at 1477-78. This Note
addresses the particulars of this argument and the court's response in Part IV.C.
183. See Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1477-78. According to the court, 'There should be no
question that the electorate as a whole, whether by referendum or otherwise, could not order
governmental action violative of the Constitution, and the government may not avoid the
strictures of the Constitution by deferring to the wishes or objections of some fraction of the
body politic." Id. (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448
(1985)) (internal quotes and brackets omitted).
184. Id. at 1479.
185. The significance of a once-in-a-lifetime event weighed heavily against the solemniza-
tion argument (elucidated in Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist. (Jones I1), 977 F.2d 963, 966-
67 (5th Cir. 1992)) and in favor of prohibiting prayers. See Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1482
(citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 595-96 (1992)). In light of the Supreme Court's analysis
in Lee, the age and maturity of the audience were illegitimate grounds to distinguish student-
led from clergy-led prayers because maturity could not "immunize[] [students] from the
coercion endemic in coerced participation." Id. (citing Lee, 505 U.S. at 593, and thus rejecting
Jones II, 977 F.2d at 971). As in Harris, Black Horse Pike administrators "supervised and
controlled the graduation ceremony," constituting sufficient state involvement to make the
student-delivered prayers offensive to the Establishment Clause. Id. at 1483. As the court
pointed out, "if the vitality of our fundamental liberties turned upon their ability to inspire the
support of a majority, the longevity of our 'inalienable rights' would be controlled by the ebb and
flow of political and social passion." Id.
186. Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 1999).
187. See id. at 814 (citing Hogue v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 466, 491 (5th Cir. 1997) for the
proposition that " '[o]ne panel of this Court may not overrule another [absent an intervening
decision to the contrary by the Supreme Court or the en banc court... ]' ").
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Jones 1r but did resolutely limit it.188 The court conceded that merely
putting the graduation prayer question to a student vote does not
automatically remove the government's imprimatur. 1 9 The court
observed that sectarian and proselytizing prayers delivered with the
state's permission in an environment imbued with its authority bear
the state's imprimatur and "undoubtedly convey[ ] a message.., that
the government endorses religion."190 It then held that merely
combining a student vote with a nonsectarian nonproselktizing
requirement "save[s]" a prayer from constituting Lee's "formal
religious exercise" s' and thus passes constitutional muster. The court
held that only student prayers governed by these two requirements
pass the endorsement and effects tests, but the court deftly avoided
deciding whether students delivering such prayers nonetheless act as
state agents.1 92
Most recently, Adler slammed the door on the students-are-
not-state-agents argument. Carefully drawing factual analogies to
other graduation prayer cases 93 and citing Supreme Court author-
ity,194 the Eleventh Circuit held that an "elected student speaker's
independent choice of a topic is a choice fairly attributable to the
state" because constitutional controls apply when a state grants
permission to individuals to exercise governmental functions. 195 The
188. See id. at 822. Santa Fe described Jones 1 as being a "tightly circumscribed safe
harbor." Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d at 818.
189. See id. at 816-19, 822.
190. Id. at 818.
191. See id. at 818, 822. The court did not explain what the nonsectarian, nonproselytizing
requirement adds to the student-initiated factor that divorces the speaker from the state such
that he does not act as the state's agent. If the nonsectarian, nonproselytizing requirement did
not save the prayer in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588-90 (1992), and Santa Fe holds that
putting the prayer to a vote does not alone avoid making the speaker an agent of the state, an
explanation of why both elements together allow the prayer to survive constitutional challenge
would be illuminating.
192. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d at 818 (holding that, because stripping Santa
Fe's prayer policy of the nonsectarian, nonproselytizing requirement leaves it "constitutionally
deficient," the court need "not belabor the point" that a policy without those restrictions violates
the coercion test).
193. See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 174 F.3d 1236, 1245-48 (11th Cir. 1999) (for
purposes of agency analysis, distinguishing Jones II and analogizing to Santa Fe because the
school board's policy permitted sectarian and proselytizing prayers; the court did not endorse
the content-based analysis but made clear that its holding was consistent with Fifth Circuit
precedent banning sectarian and proselytizing prayers).
194. See id. at 1246 (citing Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966), and Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961)).
195. Id. The court concluded, "the state cannot erase its control over or endorsement of
prayer at a public school graduation through delegation of one portion of the graduation
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court finally held that the state's inherent control over the ceremony
and its initial grant of permission so infuse the event with the state's
imprint that first delegating the speech decision to students and then
further delegating content decisions to the elected speaker nonethe-
less amounts to control sufficient to meet the state control "dominant
fact' of Lee.19s
The Harris, Black Horse Pike, and Adler decisions (along with
Santa Fe's view of Jones B's agency holding) are demonstrably
consistent with the Supreme Court's leading religious-state-agent
cases. Different principles control government-facilitated speech and
the government's own speech.197 A state's delegation of its "discre-
tionary authority over public schools" to a definitively religious agent
violates the Establishment Clause when there are no assurances that
state power "will be exercised neutrally."198 When a religious group
participates in a public forum and the state has taken steps to avoid
an agency relationship, neutrality toward religion commands opening
the forum to all groups regardless of viewpoint. 99 Thus, neutrality
ceremony to the majority/plurality vote of students." Id. at 1247. The Eleventh Circuit
described this action thus: "[T]he school system believed it could give a 'wink and a nod' to
controlling Establishment Clause jurisprudence through attempting to delegate to the
majority/plurality vote of students what it could not do on its own-permit and sponsor
sectarian and proselytizing prayer at graduation ceremonies." Id. at 1246.
196. Id. at 1248. This Note, of course, rejects the significance of the state control and
direction dominant fact but finds the Adler court's analysis persuasive in rejecting the chosen-
students-are-not-state-actors argument. Viewed another way, the Adler analysis supports the
notion that ostensibly independent student speakers, because they received the opportunity to
speak from a precedent official grant, operated only as agents of the state under constructive
state control. The agency analysis, then, constructively meets the "first dominant fact" of Lee
and dispenses with the need to reject that fact as what this Note considers logical surplussage.
197. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 833-34 (1995) (holding that when
the state "is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its own message," it may
discriminate against speech based on content, but when the state facilitates speech, viewpoint-
discrimination is inappropriate).
198. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet (Kiryas Joel), 512 U.S. 687,
696-97 (1994) (opinion of Souter, J.) (striking down a delegation of discretionary power because
"it lacked any effective means of guaranteeing that the delegated power would be used
exclusively for secular, neutral, and nonideological purposes") (internal quotations omitted;
emphasis added). Justice Souter relied on the Court's commands that government demonstrate
"wholesome neutrality" toward religion. Id. at 696 (quoting School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 222 (1963) (internal quotations omitted); see also Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792-93 (1973). This delegation rule obviously applies where
the prayer issue itself goes before students, who are asked to select or not select a definitively
religious actor. The rule also applies to situations where the question was more open-ended,
such as students voting on a brief "message" at the beginning and end of the ceremony. See
Adler, 174 F.3d at 1246 (11th Cir. 1999).
199. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 842.
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toward religion2° controls any discretion that senior classes may
democratically exercise unless commencement ceremonies constitute
open forums.201
C. Where Some Forums are More Open Than Others
Beginning with the Jones IT student-choice case and continuing
into the Madison secular-selection-criteria case, courts have employed
the open forum analysis propounded in Mergens and Rosenberger to
validate otherwise suspect religious speech at commencement
ceremonies.22 At its heart, the argument posits that the state has
created an open forum sufficient to avoid an agency relationship203 and
to remove any possibility of perceived official endorsement of religion
through its accommodation of religious speech.2°4 In this vein, the
Jones H court held that removing the school board from the decision
to hold a prayer created an open forum .20 Because of the open forum
200. For an explanation of formal and substantive neutrality in relation to several cases
discussed by this Note, see Drimmer, supra note 165, at 419-27.
201. Kiryas Joel turned in part upon New York state's demarcation of the political
subdivision in question along religious lines. Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 698-702. If such a factual
requirement were applied to the graduation prayer cases-that is, proscribing delegation to
students in communities with a history of fervent religiosity-the peculiar and constitutionally
indefensible result that students in Rexberg, Idaho, see Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147
F.3d 832, 836 n.6 (9th Cir. 1998), could not vote on a benediction, while students in more diverse
communities could, would arise. Kiryas Joel teaches that states may delegate their discretion
only to "individuals whose religious identities are incidental to their receipt of civic authority."
Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 699. Implicit in the opinion, then, is the notion that recipients of civic
authority are not only bound by the same discretionary restraints as government but receive no
more and no less "discretion" than the state itself had. Since the delegations in Jones H, Harris,
and Black Horse Pike were limited to the prayer question, and Lee compels a single resolution to
that question, the delegations were effectively meaningless.
202. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d at 836, 838 (discussing Rosenberger-style
neutrality and Mergene-style avoidance of entanglement); Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist.
(Jones 11), 977 F.2d 963, 968-69 (5th Cir. 1992) (invoking the Mergens open forum analysis).
203. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981).
204. See, e.g., Jones IT, 977 F.2d at 968-69 (using open forum analysis in its validation of a
graduation prayer).
205. Id. But see Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 821 (5th Cir. 1999)
(declaring that Jones II found parallels with Mergens but did not rely on the "public forum"
analysis because to do so would require removing the nonsectarian, nonproselytizing content
restrictions). To the contrary, Jones 11 relied extensively on Mergens' open forum analysis to
hold that graduation prayers did not constitute endorsement, although it never used those
terms. Jones IT, 977 F.2d at 968-69. The Santa Fe court's disingenuous assertion that Jones H
did not rely on the open forum doctrine, despite analysis infused with divorcing the state from a
religious message delivered by "private" parties at a state event on state grounds, resulted from
the precarious dance the court had to perform. The only way to avoid overturning Jones H in
Santa Fe was to rely on the nonsectarian, nonproselytizing requirement present in the Jones H
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aspects of its holding, the Madison court suggested that steps taken
to prohibit prayers offered by students selected on neutral criteria
violated the Free Exercise rights of those studentso6 and raised
entanglement concerns. 20 7
The factual nuances of the Black Horse Pike, Jones IT, Adler,
Harris, and Madison cases make it difficult to generalize about what
factors create an open forum. The principal in Black Horse Pike
rejected the ACLU's request to speak on both content and limited-
time grounds.08 The Jones H and Adler school districts permitted
students to choose from a variety of solemnization methods; the
districts' policies were permissive insofar as graduates would collec-
tively decide whether an invocation would include a "supplication to a
deity," lack such references, or not take place at all.209 In Harris, the
school district attempted to delegate to students control over every
aspect of the ceremony.210 Madison involved an attempt to create a
completely boundless forum, wherein the district rewarded several
students for superior academic performance with the opportunity to
address the commencement ceremony on whatever topic they de-
sired.211 No matter the degree of freedom participants in these
purported open forums possessed, comparing these attempts at
forum-creation with the Supreme Court's equal access holdings, in
light of the Court's edicts on the authority of schools to control
analysis, even though that requirement garnered less treatment than the subtle though
undeniable open forum strains of the discussion.
206. Madison Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d at 836. The Free Speech and Exercise Clauses apply to
private speech such as that offered in an open forum. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 225-26 (1963); cf. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 833-39 (1995); Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392-95 (1993) (holding religious
speech protected in a government-owned and -created open forum by the Free Speech Clause
and rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge).
207. Madison Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d at 838.
208. ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg. Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1475 (3d Cir. 1996). In a
telling concession, the principal indicated that "any student who attempted to give an
unscheduled address ... would be arrested" even if a majority of the graduating students had
previously approved the speech. Id. at 1479.
209. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 174 F.3d 1236, 1238-39 (11th Cir. 1999); Jones II, 977
F.2d at 969.
210. Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 452-53 (9th Cir. 1994Y. The principal
claimed to have no authority to control any aspect of the ceremony, "even if the students voted
to 'have the whole thing be a religious service."' Id. at 453.
211. Madison Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d at 834.
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student speakers,212 reveals a categorical inability to turn a high
school graduation into an open forum.213
The Supreme Court has carefully struck a precarious balance214
between students' rights to express themselves and schools' need to
focus pupils on education.215 Except in a public forum or other
uncontrolled environment, schools have power to reasonably censor
speakers in order to protect the welfare of listeners.216 The classic
example of appropriate censorship, punishing a student for employing
a sexually explicit metaphor in a student government nominating
speech to a high school assembly, passed constitutional muster
because public schools are charged with inculcating the values of
republican society and establishing the parameters of civil discourse,
and because the assembly was designedly part of the school's peda-
gogical program.21 7 Schools will always have power to control student
expression in order to further the educational mission.218
To encourage liberal discourse and still maintain the ability to
protect listeners, schools can create a limited open forum, in which
the Court will allow discrimination as to subject matter but not as to
212. See generally Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (authorizing
punishment of a student who addressed a high school assembly with indecent though not
obscene language).
213. See Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 821 (5th Cir. 1999) (observing that
the time, space, and other restrictions set by the school board "so shrink the pool of potential
speakers and topics that the graduation ceremony cannot possibly be characterized as a public
forum-limited or otherwise-at least not without fingers crossed or tongue in cheek").
214. For an argument that this "balance" is unstable and possibly misplaced, see David L.
Dagley, Trends in Judicial Analysis Since Hazelwoo& Expressive Rights in the Public Schools,
123 WEST'S ED. L. REP. 1 (1998).
215. Although students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate," Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969), "[a] school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its 'basic
educational mission.' " Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (quoting
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685). For a discussion of schoolchildren's constitutional freedoms, see Lisa
A. Brown & Christopher Gilbert, Understanding the Constitutional Rights of School Children,
34 HOUS. LAW. 40 (1997).
216. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 266-67. Officials cannot punish students
"merely for expressing their personal views on the school premises-whether in the cafeteria, or
on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours-unless school authorities
have reason to believe such expression will substantially interfere with the work of the school or
impinge upon the rights of other students." Id. at 266 (internal quotations and citations
omitted). Except in a public forum, "school officials may impose reasonable restrictions on the
speech of students, teachers, and other members of the school community." Id. at 267.
217. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677-78, 681-86.
218. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist,, 484 U.S. at 266.
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viewpoint.219 Accordingly, categorically excluding sexually suggestive
speeches, or other inappropriate topics, while permitting a discussion
of religious issues could save a graduation policy that tolerated prayer
on a limited open forum theory.220 To limit a forum to the specific
purposes for which it was designed, the state may "reserv[e] it for
certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics."221 Although the
government creates a forum "only by intentionally opening a nontra-
ditional forum for public discourse,"'222 once it has done so, the state
must observe the boundaries it has set.223 State control over a limited
open forum may only be content-based, not viewpoint-based, so as to
exclude subjects from discussion, not perspectives.224
Public schools do not typify the traditional open forum.25 The
town common is the archetypal state-owned public forum, as the
property has been dedicated, either legally or historically, to the
219. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 828-30 (1995) (citing Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) and Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983)); see also Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392-93 (1993); cf. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684-85.
220. The Court has stated that "[tihe determination of what manner of speech in the
classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board," Fraser,
478 U.S. at 683, subject, of course, to constitutional restraints on, inter alia, establishment. See
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223-24 (1963).
221. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806); see also Board of
Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 240-41 (1990) (finding a limited open forum for non-curriculum
related student groups at a high school); Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 267 (describing
similar limitations); Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 392-94 (holding that a limited forum must allow
inclusion of religious viewpoint when other viewpoints on similar issues present).
222. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 267 (internal quotations omitted). "If the facilities
have [not been opened for indiscriminate use by the general public... or some segment of the
public, but have] instead been reserved for other intended purposes, communicative or
otherwise, then no public forum has been created .... ." Id. (citations and internal quotations
omitted). "'The government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited
discourse...."' Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802).
223. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829. If a speaker comes within the class of speakers to
which the state opened its forum, "[iut may impose reasonable, content-neutral time, place, and
manner restrictions..., but it may regulate expressive content only if such restriction is
necessary, and narrowly drawn, to serve a compelling state interest." Capitol Square Review
and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760-61 (1995) (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 45).
224. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-30. In dicta, Justice Kennedy wrote that the state
could not employ viewpoint discrimination even where access to the forum is physically limited,
such as if "the meeting rooms in Lamb's Chapel [had] been scarce," but would have to "allocate
the scarce resources on some acceptable neutral principle." Id. at 835. The scarcity of which
Justice Kennedy speaks seems not to include the ultimate scarcity: only one space in the open
forum.
225. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 267. They "do not possess all of the attributes of
streets, parks, and other traditional public forums that 'time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions.'" Id. (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
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public for any number of uses.226 A board of education can open the
schoolhouse doors after hours to a variety of groups, and doing so
creates a public forum where freedom of expression is protected.2 7
Within the context of a university student activities fee allocation
scheme, denying funding to a religious group while granting funding
to other organizations that approach similar issues from a non-
religious perspective violates the free speech of students attempting
to participate in the open forum.228 Each of these bears the hallmark
of a true forum: speakers and listeners alike enjoy "a free and robust
marketplace of ideas,"229 where dissenters can present counter-
arguments and, perhaps most importantly, people can choose to not
listen at all.30
A significant exception to the open forum doctrine limits its
application in secondary schools. In this setting, when the public
perceives the imprimatur of the state in a medium that might
otherwise constitute an open forum, the open forum doctrine does not
apply, and state controls that would normally fail on free speech or
free exercise grounds become acceptable.231 In such a setting, religious
226. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board, 515 U.S. at 757-58, 763 (holding a
state-owned public square around the Ohio state house, dedicated to the public for "free
discussion of public questions, or for activities of a broad public purpose," a public forum;
permission to erect displays on the land was governed by content-neutral policy of advisory
board).
227. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 391-
94 (1993); Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 231-32, 243-46 (1990).
228. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845-46.
229. Id. at 850 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (referring to the University of Virginia's
atmosphere of contentious debate in student media); cf. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 252 (noting "the
broad spectrum of officially recognized student clubs [and that] students are free to initiate and
organize additional student clubs"). Rosenberger was 'not the harder case where religious
speech threatens to dominate the forum." Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 850-51 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 275 (1981) (noting that religious speech did
not threaten to dominate the forum).
230. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267-68 (discussing "the capacity of a group or individual to
participate in the intellectual give and take of campus debate") (internal quotations omitted);
DQe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 820 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding as a matter of law
that the school district had not created a limited public forum in part because "a graduation
ceremony comprises but a single activity which is singular in purpose, the diametric opposite of
a debate or other venue for the exchange of competing viewpoints").
231. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270-71 (1988) (permitting
extensive official control over high-school student expression that "students, parents, and
members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.., so
long as [the activities] are supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular
knowledge ...."). But see Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 (observing that "an open forum in a public
university... available to a broad class of nonreligious as well as religious speakers" does not
confer any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices). Mergens applied the
logic of Widmar to the secondary school setting, Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248, but did so on facts
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speech that constitutes establishment is entirely barred. 2 Whether
religious speech bears the imprimatur of the state turns on the extent
to which listeners perceive state endorsement of religion.233
Because secondary school commencements lack the salient
aspects of open forums, the equal access principle is inapposite.234
While schools could theoretically dedicate their graduation ceremo-
nies as an open forum for discourse on a variety of topics (including
religion), the real-world facts of the graduation prayer cases make
such a theoretical or declared dedication constitutionally infirm.235 In
all cases except Madison, a political majority has retained control over
the purported forum and, unless limited by constitutional protections,
can refuse access to any viewpoint it dislikes.236 Indeed, the scope of
the power delegated to students in Jones I and Black Horse Pike was
analogous to Widmar, i.e., non-discriminatory access to school facilities, id. at 248-49, and
distinguishable from Hazelwood School District, wherein the school maintained extensive
editorial control of a newspaper produced by a journalism class. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S.
at 268.
232. "[Compliance with the Establishment Clause is a state interest sufficiently compelling
to justify content-based restrictions on speech." Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v.
Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761-62 (1995). Where the open forum and establishment analyses collide,
the results run to the extremes: (1) if the forum is open to the speaker, no establishment can
arise and any regulation of religious speech is a viewpoint-based violation of free speech, or (2) if
there is not an open forum, religious speech is attributable to the state and impermissibly
establishmentarian. See id. at 761-70 (inter alia describing Lamb's Chapel and Widmar as
"categorically reject[ing] the State's establishment clause defense" upon the Court's finding of
an open forum); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (observing that "[the principle that
government may accommodate the free exercise of religion does not supersede the fundamental
limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause').
233. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 841-42; cf. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 515
U.S. at 777 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (remarking that the Establishment Clause "imposes
affirmative obligations that may require a State, in some situations, to take steps to avoid being
perceived as supporting or endorsing a private religious message"). The Rosenberger Court
noted that, in the context of the marketplace of ideas at the University of Virginia and in light of
the steps the University took "to disassociate itself from the private speech" of the religious
publication, "there is no real likelihood that the speech in question is being either endorsed or
coerced by the State." Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 841-42. Hence, the "concern that [the
publication's] religious orientation would be attributed to the University is not a plausible fear."
Id. at 841. See also Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 174 F.3d 1236, 1247-48 (11th Cir. 1999)
(describing the connection between the state's imprimitur on speech and endorsement).
234. For an argument that an open forum was present in neither Jones It nor Harris but
that schools can, by adopting secular selection criteria, create an open forum at their
graduations, see Rick A. Swanson, Time for a Change: Analyzing Graduation Invocations and
Benedictions Under Religiously Neutral Principles of the Public Forum, 26 U. MEM. L. REV.
1405 (1996).
235. See Adler, 174 F.3d at 1250 (citing ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg. Bd. of Educ., 84
F.3d 1471, 1478 (3d Cir. 1996); Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832, 838 (9th Cir.
1998)).
236. In Adler, the selected speaker did make the final topic-selection decision, Adler, 174
F.3d at 1239-40, but the reality of speaker selection contests teaches that anticipated (if not
promised) content will play a role in voters' decisions.
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exceptionally limited: discretion over a single speaker, who could offer
an invocation or say nothing at all.237 These limitations are entirely
inconsistent with the government activity necessary for creation of an
open forum: the dedication "for indiscriminate use by... some
segment of the public."8 Even where a student plebiscite picked two
speakers who could deliver a "message," Adler held that no open
forum existed because schools exercised great control over the
ceremonies and only majority-favored speakers could offer state-
ments.39 Moreover, university students selecting from a variety of
student publications24° and secondary school students attending or
abstaining from on-campus meetings of diverse student groups,
2 41
participate in a marketplace of ideas more open than that enjoyed by
graduation audiences where, ultimately, school officials have absolute
control over who may speak.242 Finally, because of the precedent,
overwhelming, and inescapable state control of and responsibility for
the event,243 graduation speeches bear the imprimatur of the state,244
which removes them from the equal access analysis.
D. Who Loses When Schools Permit Graduation Prayers
The Framers designed the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses in part to protect religious dissenters from majority oppres-
sion.245 Lee v. Weisman pursued that end by sustaining the objection
of a single student to a state-sponsored religious service.246 Thus, to
237. The speakers did not have the option of offering an anti-religious speech. If the
graduates desired such, their only option was to say nothing at all. See Black Horse Pike, 84
F.3d at 1475; Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist. (Jones I1), 977 F.2d 963, 964 n.1 (5th Cir.
1992). But see Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 452 (9th Cir. 1994) (reviewing
policy that ostensibly gave graduates control over every aspect of the ceremony).
238. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 267.
239. Adler, 174 F.3d at 1250.
240. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text (describing facts of Rosenberger).
241. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (describing facts of Mergens).
242. See Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 820 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that
"a graduation ceremony comprises but a single activity which is singular in purpose, the
diametric opposite of a debate or other venue for the exchange of competing viewpoints').
243. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592-93 (1992); see also id. at 629-30 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
244. See Adler, 174 F.3d at 1243-44, 1247-48; Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d at 817.
245. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (describing the design of the two
clauses); Lee, 505 U.S. at 589, 622 (Souter, J., concurring); cf Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38, 52
(1985) (discussing the current interpretation of the First Amendment as protecting not merely
different Christian sects but all religious beliefs and none at all).
246. Lee, 505 U.S. at 598-99.
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properly reconcile the various First Amendment policies competing in
the graduation prayer setting, a court must examine the facts from
the viewpoint of a person in the audience.247 Observing the real life
consequences of designedly sterile rules and policies crystallizes the
salience of the issues and, in the graduation prayer cases, compels the
result.248 Mere formal neutrality toward religion fails to recognize
these consequences and in some cases permits coercive state action
that in turn can reflect endorsement of religion.
Reviewing a policy that permitted students chosen on secular
grounds to speak on any subject they chose, specifically including
offering a prayer, the Madison court applied both the tripartite Lemon
test and the Lee coercion test.249 Although it recognized that the
school district's coercive pressures may be no less oppressive than in
Lee, the court distinguished that case largely because this school
district did not act to deliberately include a prayer or select a
speaker. 210 Because students selected on a "purely secular and
neutral criterion" had final authority over whether audience members
would hear a prayer, the court concluded that, unlike the principal in
Lee, the school did not mandate a religious event.251
247. See ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg. Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1480 (3d Cir. 1996)
(analyzing the facts from the perspective of dissenters in the audience and finding coercion
despite the school's passing control to the senior class); cf. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S.
226, 235-36 (1990) (quoting and interpreting the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074
(1998), which prohibits the state from "requir[ing] any person to participate in [religious activity
in schools], or compel[ling] any [student,] school agent or employee to attend a meeting if the
content of the speech at the meeting is contrary to that person's beliefs&); cf. also Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 843 (1995) (stating that "[t]he error made by... the dissent[]
lies in focusing on the money that is undoubtedly expended by the government, rather than on
the nature of the benefit received by the recipient).
248. For the view that prayers offered by students selected to speak by secular criteria do
not violate the Establishment Clause, see Johanna Josie Raimond, Note, The Constitutionality
of Student-Led Prayer at Public School Graduation Ceremonies, 48 VAND. L. REV. 257 (1995).
249. Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832, 834-38 (9th Cir. 1998). The court
determined that the policy had the secular purpose of, among other things, rewarding students
for academic performance. See id. at 836-37. Finding no entanglement on the facts, the court
observed that the opposite result would foster entanglement via official censorship of speeches.
See id. at 838. Because the policy does have the primary effect, albeit indirect, of advancing
religion, this Note discusses only the effects prong of the court's analysis.
250. See id. at 835 (quoting Lee at length). The court first interpreted the portion of Lee
concerning "state officials direct[ing] the performance of the religious exercise" as meaning that
"[t]he school's selection of the speaker and provision of the guidelines were... tantamount to
composing the prayer itself .... ." Id. (internal quotations omitted). The court then found three
distinguishing features of the school district's policy: students (as opposed to clerics) delivered
the presentations, the speakers were chosen by "academic performance," and the students have
autonomy over the content. Id.
251. Id.
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In addressing the effects prong of the Lemon test, the court
examined the entirety of the district's policy on its face.252 The court
stressed that the policy's permissive nature eliminated the possibility
that the government itself acted in a way that produced religion-
advancing effects.253 The court also found that the school district
moderated any pro-religious effects by expressly disclaiming official
endorsement of religion and declaring the speeches "private expres-
sion."254 Finally, the court suggested that the state's neutral speaker-
selection criterion made finding official endorsement of religion
difficult255 and avoided placing the imprimatur of the state on relig-
ious speech.56
Perhaps the most revealing passages of the decision, these
observations underscore the myopic nature of the court's analysis.
The court's logic rests entirely on the assertion that when a policy
identifies a speaker via secular criteria, and that speaker chooses to
inject a religious message, the state avoids any impermissible
connection with religion.27 This view fails to recognize the implicit
statement of the Supreme Court's holding in Lee: the salient issue in
graduation prayer cases is coercion.258 Policies that select student
speakers on a secular basis but permit them to deliver religious
messages can produce the same results on the audience at issue in
Lee: no matter how a school selects the speakers, dissenters may be
unwillingly forced to suffer a religious message as a result of the
system the state establishes.259
252. See id. at 837.
253. See id. (holding that "[w]hile an independent student choice to read a prayer may have
a religious effect, this is not the effect of the policy on its face").
254. Id.
255. See id. at 835 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 630 n.8 (1992) (Souter, J.,
concurring)).
256. See id. at 836.
257. See id. at 835 (applying this logic to the coercion test; the remainder of the opinion
tirelessly returns to this point). The court did not address the agency principles discussed by
this Note. See supra Part IV.B. Those principles indicate that when the state taps an
individual to address an audience-no matter what arbitrary, capricious, random, discrimina-
tory, or deliberate selection device it uses-that individual acts as an agent of the state. The
court instead maintained that the speakers are autonomous individuals, see id. at 835-36, even
while noting that "the graduation ceremony is not a public forum." Id. at 838. For the sake of
argument, this section of this Note will assume that the graduation speaker is acting without
the color of the state-a concession that serves to underscore the significance of the coercion at
work in the ceremonies.
258. Lee, 505 U.S. at 586-87; see also id. at 609 (Souter, J., concurring).
259. See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 174 F.3d 1236, 1250 (11th Cir. 1999).
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When the state has assembled an audience for purposes of
delivering an already earned state benefit, then turns that involun-
tary audience over to a speaker and permits him to offer a prayer, the
audience members have been coerced by the state to participate in a
religious event, no matter what method of speaker selection operates
behind the scenes. 260 The school district's graduation policy comprises
three acts: 1) the state, in order to confer an already earned benefit,
involuntarily assembles students; 2) the state nominates a speaker
and places that speaker before its captive audience; finally, 3) the
speaker delivers a prayer. The first and last acts coerce audience
members.21 The Ninth Circuit concedes as much.262 Madison, then,
turns on the holding that the selection criteria, by its formally neutral
nature, privatizes and cleanses the religious coercion in the last act.
From the perspective of the student dissenter in the audience, whom
the state has placed before the speaker, the selection criterion is
unclear and of little moment. 263 No doubt, the selection criterion itself
is sufficiently neutral toward religion,264 but neutrality is not
enough,265 for it cannot change the coercive result of speech that the
state's action in devising the selection system and foreswearing
content control permits.26 The bottom line is that students still face a
260. Cf. Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 817 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that
"government imprimatur is not so easily masked: Prayers that a school 'merely' permits will
still be delivered to a government-organized audience, by means of government-owned
appliances and equipment, on government-controlled property, at a government-sponsored
event... ).
261. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 586, 593 (obligatory attendance and practical inability of
dissenting expression, respectively, constitute this coercion).
262. See Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832, 835 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that
"the pressures on a student to attend graduation and to conform with her peers []may well be
present here, and thus cannot serve as a distinction [from Lee]").
263. See ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg. Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1480 (3d Cir. 1996)
(finding coercion despite the school's vesting control of the decision to offer a prayer in a
democratic plurality of graduates, who in turn selected a student to offer the prayer); cf. Santa
Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d at 817.
264. See Madison Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d at 836.
265. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995) (stating that neutrality
is a "significant factor" but, implicitly, not a dispositive one); id. at 877-78 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the majority's "significant factor" statement and quoting several other
cases where neutrality was present but not dispositive of an Establishment Clause challenge).
See also Dhananjai Shivakumar, Neutrality and the Religion Clauses, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 505, 505 (1998) (arguing that "neutrality is an end, a substantive political ideal
that... should not necessarily form the functional test for judging governmental actions
affecting religion"); Drimmer, supra note 165, at 421-24.
266. See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 174 F.3d 1236, 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting
that "a reasonable student will not realize that student-elected sectarian and proselytizing
prayerful messages at graduation ceremonies are divorced from state sponsorship and instead,
realizing the views to be that of the majority, will feel coerced to participate in them").
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choice between foregoing graduation or foregoing the right to be free
from unwanted prayer. The absence of active state speaker selection
simply does not make a student feel empowered to dissent.267
At best, the state's permissive attitude toward prayers
converts the certainty of audience member coercion in Lee into a
possibility.268 A realistic and well-founded possibility that one will
experience coercion of the conscience, then, becomes the price of
attending one's own graduation.269 Viewed in this light, the differ-
ences between Lee and Madison become a matter of degree. That the
state had discounted the constitutional price of attendance, or made it
a gamble on a third party's whim, cannot satisfy the exacting protec-
tions the Establishment Clause affords.27°
The Madison court resolved only a facial challenge to the
district's policy.271 Yet its analysis-especially under the effects prong
of the Lemon test-assumed such a formalistic view of facial chal-
lenges that the court did not consider the inevitable results of the
policy.2 2 Under the court's view, a facial challenge appraises only the
literal words of the policy.23 The policy, however, produces two
267. Without meaningful opportunities for dissent, of course, an audience member
involuntarily subjected to a message suffers coercion. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592-94
(1992).
268. In practice, this possibility was an effective certainty, as "the high school's official
commencement programs from 1988 through 1995... reveal that both an Invocation and a
Benediction were included as part of the school's graduation ceremony in all eight years."
Madison Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d at 834 n.3.
269. Cf. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992) (describing coercion of the conscience as
the unconstitutional price of attending one's own graduation). Under an Adler-style policy,
students would likely know beforehand whether the majority-elected speaker planned to offer a
prayer. Thus, student choice can convert the possibility of coercion the school district worked so
hard to create back into a certainty.
270. But see Drimmer, supra note 165, at 437-38 (arguing that the critical examination in
religion-neutral selection criteria cases is not the procedures at work but the ultimate fact that
prayer occurs).
271. Madison Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d at 835-38.
272. Cf. Committee for Pub. Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774-80 (1973)
(striking down a state law that, on its face, merely provided funds for maintenance of sectarian
schools because, without provisions restricting use of funds to repair of purely secular
structures, the law's "effect, inevitably, is to... advance the religious mission of sectarian
schools').
273. See Madison Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d at 837. The court concluded that because the policy
does not, on its face, "mandate or direct that prayers be read," it cannot be said "'that the
government itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence."' Id. (quoting
Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, 337 (1987)). This analysis fails to recognize that government activities may advance
religion notwithstanding their permissive nature, especially in cases where the government has
assembled the audience and delivered their captive attention to a speaker whom it granted
unrestrained discretion to engage in any sort of religious speech.
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distinct kinds of effects: the effects of its abstract existence and the
inevitable consequences of putting it into practice.274 The effects of
abstract existence include the message the policy sends to people who
know about it.275 Being subject to the practical consequences of the
policy, in contrast, requires no knowledge of the policy's content.
By considering only the effects of the policy's abstract exis-
tence, the court swept the critical holding of Lee under the judicial
rug. It ignored the fact that whenever the school district put the
policy into practice, the policy would deliver a captive audience to a
speaker whom the state specifically granted absolute control over the
content of his presentation.276 Accordingly, the policy's indisputable
practical effect is that speakers will have the opportunity to lead an
involuntarily assembled group of students in prayer. The existence of
this opportunity to coerce the conscience, in its own right, advances
religion and thus fails the Lemon test.277
When the Supreme Court has validated state actions that
confer benefits on religious groups or speakers via substantively
neutral standards, it has also found no possibility of advancement of
religion or coercion of dissenters. Dismissing the possibility that the
Equal Access Act at issue in Mergens might coerce students, the Court
observed with satisfaction that, because meetings could not occur
during instructional time, the Act did not implicate compulsory
attendance or social-pressure-to-conform concerns. 278  Critical to the
Lee decision, the Court held that graduation ceremonies involve both
compulsory attendance and social pressure to conform.279 Discussing
the neutrality of the program in Rosenberger,280 the Court noted that
274. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 838-39 (1995) (declaring that "we
must in each case inquire... into the practical details of [a] program's operation").
275. The court rightly concluded that the policy's abstract existence does not endorse or
advance religion. See Madison Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d at 835, 837. In contrast, a law that requires
placing privately funded placards bearing the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms,
see Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 39-40 n.1 (1980), would, by the mere fact of its abstract
existence and without its ever being put into practice, convey a message of state endorsement of
religion.
276. Indeed, the policy granted specific permission to offer a prayer. See Madison Sch.
Dist., 147 F.3d at 834.
277. See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 174 F.3d 1236, 1250 (11th Cir. 1999).
278. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 251 (1990) (remarking that "there is little if
any risk of official state endorsement or coercion where no formal classroom activities are
involved and no school officials actively participate").
279. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586, 593 (1992).
280. In dicta, the Court wrote that in Rosenberger and Lamb's Chapel, scarcity of resources
would have required adoption of neutral criteria to determine which groups would obtain the
state benefit. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995). The Court made that
observation only after having first decided that the state had created an open forum, that
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even-handed disbursement of the student activities fee did not have a
hidden pro-religion agenda.281 In Madison, however, the petitioner
argued that the school devised the policy merely to maintain long-
standing practices of including prayers in graduations.282 Finally, as
members of the Court have observed on several occasions, facially
neutral dressing will not absolve a practice that includes other
aspects invidious to the Establishment Clause.23
E. Why Schools Have a Duty to Avoid Graduation Prayers
The Supreme Court has long affirmed the ability of schools to
regulate the events they organize, control, or which bear their
imprimatur.28 Administrators may extensively regulate speech that
occurs as an integral part of a school's educational mission.285 Speech
and activities outside the traditional classroom setting may never-
theless fall within this well-regulated category if faculty members
supervise it and it "impart[s] particular knowledge or skills to student
participants and audiences.286 Educators may censor speech for a
variety of purposes, 287 and "must be able to set high standards for the
student speech.., disseminated under [the school's] auspices.288
speakers were not state agents, and that the speech would not result in coercion. Accordingly,
this comment must be understood as advocating application of neutrality to a necessary
economic decision, not as endorsing the notion that neutrality alone will justify otherwise
impermissibly coercive state action.
281. Id. at 840. "There [was] no suggestion that the University created [the program] to
advance religion or adopted some ingenious device with the purpose of aiding a religious cause."
Id.
282. Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832, 837 (9th Cir. 1998); cf. Adler, 174
F.3d at 1250 (offering the same argument).
283. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839 (stating that neutrality is a "significant factor" but,
implicitly, not a dispositive one); id. at 877-78 (Souter, J., dissenting); Capitol Square Review &
Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) ("[The Establishment Clause forbids a State to hide behind the application of
formally neutral criteria and remain studiously oblivious to the effects of its actions.")
"[N]eutrality... does not permit a State to require a religious exercise even with the consent of
the majority of those affected...." School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225-26 (1963).
284. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833-34; Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,
270-71 (1988).
285. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 271.
286. Id.
287. See id. Appropriate motivations for censorship include ensuring "that participants
learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach .... and that the views of the individual
speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school... [and to] disassociate [the
school] ... from speech that would ... impinge upon the rights of other students." Id. (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
288. Id. at 271-72.
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Moreover, when speech bears the imprimatur of the state or when the
school placed the speaker before the audience, settled doctrine
indicates that officials must exercise control, i.e., cannot foreswear
responsibility for the content of speech it fosters.289
Because commencement exercises, like no other government-
initiated gathering save the public school classroom or assembly,290
have such power to influence participants, courts should regard
graduation as part of the regular pedagogical program and impose the
same restrictions and duties that apply in the classroom environment.
While a variety of courts have suggested that the same rules apply in
each situation,291 an explicit holding to that effect will clarify the law292
and prevent schools from establishing creative outcome-oriented
devices designed to permit conscience-coercing prayer.29 3
289. "At a high school graduation, teachers and principals must and do retain a high degree
of control over the precise contents of the program, the speeches, the timing, the movements,
the dress, and the decorum of students." Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597 (1992). See also
Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 272 (declaring that "[a] school must retain the authority to
refuse to sponsor student speech that might reasonably be perceived to advo-
cate.., conduct ... inconsistent with the shared values of a civilized social order, or to
associate the school with any position other than neutrality on matters of political controversy)
(internal quotations omitted); cf ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg. Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471,
1479 (3d Cir. 1996) (observing that "[s]chool officials necessarily 'retain a high degree of
control'" and that "[dielegation of one aspect of the ceremony.., does not constitute the
absence of school officials' control over the graduation').
290. "Inherent differences between the public school system and a session of a state
legislature distinguish [Lee] from Marsh v. Chambers," (upholding legislative chaplains and
opening prayers). Lee, 505 U.S. at 596. 'The atmosphere at the opening of a [legislative]
session.., where adults are free to enter and leave with little comment and for any number of
reasons cannot compare with the constraining potential of the one school event most important
for the student to attend." Id. at 597; see also Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1480 (same); cf.
Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 456 (9th Cir. 1994) (observing that in an open
forum situation like Mergens and Lamb's Chapel, "attendance at all religious as well as non-
religious meetings was entirely voluntary, no religious meeting was sponsored by the school,
and school officials neither encouraged nor participated in the meetings except on a custodial
basis').
291. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 596 (observing that graduation is "an environment analogous to
the classroom setting); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (stating
willingness to apply the same decency standards to a high school assembly and a classroom);
Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist. (Jones D1), 977 F.2d 963, 967 (5th Cir. 1992) (reversing its
prior holding that graduation and the classroom are distinguishable after the Supreme Court
vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Lee).
292. For a review of the current state of the law, including Black Horse Pike, Jones IT, and
Madison, that finds unpredictability the norm, see Ralph D. Mawdsley, Student Choice and
Graduation Prayer: Division Among the Circuits, 129 WEST'S ED. L. REP. 553 (1998). For a pre-
Madison argument in favor of a per se ban on prayers at graduations, see Philip Oliss, Note,
Praise the Lord and Pass the Diplomas: Harris v. Joint School District No. 241, 41 F.3d 447 (9th
Cir. 1994), 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 705 (1996).
293. See Smith, supra note 165, at 305-314 (describing several student-initiated prayer
policies as shams designed promote prayer); cf. Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1479-80 (observing
that the policy stated its purpose as allowing prayers while avoiding the result of Lee); Adler v.
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Realizing that-from a constitutional perspective-graduation
ceremonies and the classroom are indistinguishable, courts would
apply the same stringent restrictions to both situations. Designedly
protective and unwilling to tolerate subterfuge, these standards
prohibit states inviting privately funded religious speech into class-
rooms,29 teachers leading willing students in prayer,2 95 and schools
permitting activities on campus when the school may appear to
sponsor the speaker's views.296 Recognizing that the state holds its
graduation audience captive and state-selected speakers can coerce
listeners into participating in a religious exercise leads directly to a
single conclusion: due to their inherent and non-delegable control over
commencement exercises, schools have a duty to avoid the inclusion of
prayers at all of their official educational activities.297
F. Reconciling the Law, Reaching a New Conclusion
Because the facts of the graduation prayer cases implicate a
variety of doctrines, full treatment requires consideration of each and
Duval County Sch. Bd., 174 F.3d 1236, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999) (observing that "the school system
believed it could give a 'wink and a nod' to controlling Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence... [and] permit and sponsor sectarian and proselytizing prayer at graduation ceremo-
nies").
294. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980).
295. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56-61 (1985).
296. See McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 205, 209-12 (1948) (striking down a
policy that permitted religious teachers to enter public schools to offer religious instruction to
students); see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271-72 n.10 (1981) (discussing McCollum).
297. Cf Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (remarking that the Establishment Clause "imposes affirmative
obligations that may require a State, in some situations, to take steps to avoid being perceived
as supporting or endorsing a private religious message"). Many have argued that the control
necessary to comply with the duty to avoid prayers advocated by this Note will give rise to
entanglement forbidden by the Lemon test. See, e.g., Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147
F.3d 832, 838 (1998) (noting the possibility of entanglement resulting from an interventionist
legal rule). Although a clear policy forbidding prayers would not likely lead to impermissible
entanglement, enforcing such a policy in the face of a disobedient or determined speaker could
certainly raise such concerns. The Supreme Court has held that "[e]ntanglement must be
'excessive' before it runs afoul of the Establishment Clause." Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,
232-34 (1997) (citing and describing a case of "no excessive entanglement where government
reviews the adolescent counseling program set up by the religious institutions that are grantees,
reviews the materials used by such grantees, and monitors the program by periodic visits"); cf.
Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist. (Jones I), 977 F.2d 963, 967 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that
the court "know[s] of no authority that holds yearly review of unsolicited material for
sectarianism and proselytization to constitute excessive entanglement").
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their respective interactions.298 The most direct analysis, agency,
holds that schools cannot delegate power they do not have and
imposes on state delegates-and, ultimately, graduation speakers-
the same constitutional strictures as apply to the state itself. Even if
one does not consider speakers state agents via the behind-the-scenes
delegation process, the absence of a true open forum at graduations
and the presence of the state's imprimatur on the speeches avoids
equal access commands and makes speakers apparent agents in the
eyes of audience members. Moreover, neutral selection criteria
cannot cleanse coercive speech presented under the auspices of
government where the state's compulsory assembly of an audience
and subsequent surrender of censorial control created the opportunity
to coerce.
Assuming involuntary attendance-the cornerstone of Lee-
one realizes that the state commands an audience, which leads to the
conclusion that graduation ceremonies are "in a fair and real sense" 2
no different than classrooms, where severe limitations on religiosity
apply, including the duty to avoid subtly coercive religious speech.
While this may appear an extreme result, the Constitution has never
countenanced exacting a constitutional price to enjoy a state benefit
which one has already earned °" While, as the majority pointed out in
Lemon, the small steps in constitutional interpretation the Court
takes one day can lead to surprising yet no less firm results in the
future,3°1 one must recall that Lee's graduation prayer plainly "con-
flict[ed] with settled rules pertaining to prayer exercises for stu-
dents."302
298. For the view that the Court should approach the Establishment Clause in general
with comprehensive analysis similar to that advocated by this Note, see Richard J. Ansson, Jr.,
Drawing Lines in the Shifting Sand. Where Should the Establishment Wall Stand? Recent
Developments in Establishment Clause Theory: Accommodation, State Action, the Public Forum,
and Private Religious Speech, 8 TEMP. POL. & Cv. RTS. L. REV. 1 (1998).
299. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586 (1992).
300. See id. at 596; see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 506 n.2 (remarking that "the State may [not] impose and enforce any conditions that it
chooses upon attendance at public institutions of learning, however violative they may be of
fundamental constitutional guarantees').
301. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 624 (1971) (stating, obiter dictum, that "some
steps, which when taken were thought to approach 'the verge,' have become platform for yet
further steps').
302. Lee, 505 U.S. at 587. This dicta must mean that graduation prayers involving less
obvious establishment than Lee's did may, when properly analyzed, run afoul of the Constitu-
tion.
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V. CONCLUSION
When the state awards an individual the opportunity to
address a high-school graduation ceremony, it confers a benefit, often
in recognition of service to the community or academic achievement.
Not generally available and extant only by official fiat, this benefit is
necessarily limited to favored classes or messages. In light of these
realities, and the natural presence of officialdom at the ceremonies,
one cannot regard the occasion as an open forum. Accordingly,
graduation speakers represent official values and are the mouthpiece
of government. Neutral selection criteria-which many audience
members will not comprehend-are irrelevant if those standards
result in religious speech attributable to the state. Recognizing that
the speaker commands a captive audience certifies this position
because the benefit the state confers on speakers is actually the
provision of involuntary listeners. Due to this possibility of coercion,
inherent in addressing a captive audience controlled by demanding
social norms and devoid a meaningful opportunity to dissent,33 the
state must act to ensure that such coercion does not occur under its
auspices. Only by establishing a duty to avoid religious speech at
graduation ceremonies will courts safeguard the rights of religious
dissenters in light of those facts which marked and controlled Lee v.
Weisman.3o4
Colin Delaney*
303. See id. at 593-94.
304. Id. at 586.
* I would like to thank Vanderbilt Professor Lisa Bressman for planting the idea for this
Note and following through with beyond-the-call-of-duty editing, along with the ever-Socratic
Vanderbilt Professor Tom McCoy, who asked enough questions to put a foundation of legal
reasoning under the answer I knew was right. My editors, Austin McMullen, Jim McCray, and
Alicia Griffin deserve a great deal of credit for turning a draft into something worthy of yellow
binding. Finally, my family warrants immeasurable gratitude for, without prodding or
resistance, letting me find my way.
1999] 1829

